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In the analysis of investment opportunities in the corporate finance literature a commonly used 
standard framework is the real option approach. This examines the timing and the value of 
investment projects relying on the basic idea that a financial option on a real asset as underling 
can be thought as the opportunity (option) to invest in a project that can return a positive payoff. 
So in an environment characterized by irreversibility and uncertainty, an agent considering an 
investment opportunity needs to account for the fact that, at the time of the investment, he 
forgoes the option to postpone the investment decision in the future when the uncertainty will 
be, naturally, partly resolved. With this as starting point this thesis will focus on the timing and 
the value of an irreversible investment made in different vertical relationships settings and 
finally on the possibility to introduce the intervention of a policy maker to see if this can be 
useful in improving the timing and enhancing the value for the different agents involved.  
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As reported by McGrath and Nerkar (2004) one of the most important features for a firm is the 
ability to innovate, this in fact can be thought as one of the main reasons that allows a company 
to succeed and dominate the market. Therefore, one of the major problems that an entrepreneur 
face has to do with the decision to make new investment in technology, product or service. But 
how to account for these investments? One of the most widespread technique is represented by 
the net present value rule (NVP), that represent the basis of the neoclassical theory of 
investment. However, the NVP approach sometimes may not be the best way to evaluate some 
kind of investments, in fact often it assumes that the investment can be reversed, so that in some 
way, once a project is undertaken, this can be undone or that the expenditure sustained can be 
recovered, and also in the cases in which the irreversibility of a project is taken into account 
often this is thought as a “do it now or never”  opportunity, so that the choice of the firm are 
reduced to invest in the present or forgo the chance. For these reasons, and given that often a 
significant part of the market value of a firm consists in asset that are not yet in place (Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961) that will be the results of important irreversible investment decisions, 
another approach to evaluating a project can fit better the needs. In fact, these types of assets 
can be viewed as financial option, (Myers, 1977) in the sense that one agent may have the right 
but not the obligation to invest, consequently in the moment in which an agent decides to 
undertake an irreversible investment, it exercises its option to invest, and so it gives up the 
opportunity to wait for new information that could affect the timing or the eligibility of the 
project. Given this, usually these opportunities to acquire real assets through an irreversible 
expense are called in the literature “Real options”. My work consists in presenting different 
cases based on the application of the standard real option framework that consider investment 
opportunities as options on real assets, providing a way to apply option pricing methods to 
investment decision problems. In facts, from the above considerations, the classical net present 
value method is not always the best instrument given that it does not takes into accounts the 
value of the possibility (option) to delay an irreversible investment decision characterized by 
uncertainty. Given the large applicability of the subject I choose to focus on the study of vertical 
relationships taking as reference the basic theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty 
as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and the classic presentation of vertical relationships as described 
by Tirole (1988). I will consider a framework where at the center there is a potential risk neutral 
investor (that it may be think as an innovative start-up) interested in entering in a new high 




irreversible investment. Starting at the beginning of Chapter 1 from the simplest case in which 
it is assumed the investor will have both the financial resources and the infrastructure needed 
to get the input, I will progressively expand the problem taking into consideration different 
scenarios. Indeed, I will assume that the completion of the investment can be conditional at one 
or both conditions: the participation of an investment partner (willing to bear part of the costs 
in exchange of part of the profits deriving by the project) or/and the purchase of a discrete input 
from a supplier with market power. In all the cases examined the focus will be on the timing 
and on the value of the investment, and in which way the introduction of different agents will 
affects the results. Strictly linked to Chapter 1, in the Chapter 2 of my thesis I will run a 
simulation in which I will examine the effect that the variation of different parameters may have 
on both the investment timing and on the values of the option to invest for the potential investor, 
providing numerical examples for the different cases examined in Chapter 1. In Chapter 3 I will 
consider a more innovative framework where more than three agents are asked to interact 
together in order to undertake the project. This section is based by the fact that usually when a 
new technology or a new investment opportunity is available on the market, there may some 
competition provided by the presence of other agents. So, by assuming this, I will show the 
effects that a Bertrand competition and a Collusion agreement can have on the value and on the 
timing of the investment, considering first the case in which two upstream supplier produce the 
same input and are looking for a client and second the case in which two downstream potential 
investors interact to gain the furniture of the input they need to undertake the same project. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I will assume that the realization of the investment is of public interest, 
so that the project is will produce a positive social benefit. In this new framework I will consider 
the introduction of a policy maker that it will have an incentive to provide a subsidy with the 







Starting by the pioneers of the formal theory of the valuation of options Fischer Black, Myron 
Scholes and Robert C. Merton, the term "Real Options", was coined for the first time in the 
seventies by Myers 1  and from there has been a frequent subject of study. One of major 
references in this field is given by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), that provides a treatment of the 
investment decision under the uncertainty in the environment in which these are taken, 
highlighting the analogy of the classical financial option theory with the values of the option to 
wait for new information when one is considering an investment opportunity. Moreover, on 
this, other important contributes are given by Baldwin and Meyer (1979) that discuss 
irreversibility in the case mutually exclusive investment opportunities are faced stochastically 
over time; Bernanke (1983) that exploit a model in which is shown that waiting before 
undertake an investment can be optimal pending the resolution of a situation of significant 
uncertainty; and by McDonald and Siegel (1986) that studied the optimal time in irreversible 
investment decisions, considering both the benefit and the costs of the project to follow a 
continuous-time stochastic process.2  
Overall, the analysis regarding the real option has been used for many applications. In 
development of new technologies and R&D, between the many (e.g. McGrath, 1997, Folta, 
1998), interesting is the work of McGrath and Nerkar, (2004) that examined the outcome of the 
investment decisions taken by firms in the pharmaceutical sector over a long period of time 
with the aim to see whether a real option reasoning can explain for some of the differences 
between the actual managerial investment behavior and theorized investment behavior; 
specifically, they confirmed the use by the decision maker of a real option approach and they 
found that the decisions to pursue an option on a new technological area are influenced by the 
scope of the technological opportunity, the competition in the area, and a firm’s past investment 
behavior. In the dynamic of outsourcing agreement between the many (e.g. Moretto and 
Rossini, 2012; Di Corato et al., 2017), Alvarez and Stenbacka, (2007) found that the optimal 
threshold for the establishment of partial outsourcing is an increasing function of the underlying 
market uncertainty, showing also that an increasing in market’s uncertainty induces a higher 
optimal proportion of outsourced production once the threshold is reached. In the venture 
                                                                
1 See Myers S.C. (1977).  




capital investments3 Lukas et al., (2016) presents a dynamic model of entrepreneurial venture 
financing under uncertainty based on option exercise games between an entrepreneur and a 
venture capitalist (VC), specifically they analyze the impact of multi-staged financing and both 
economic and technological uncertainty on optimal contracting in the context of VC-financing, 
showing that both sources of uncertainty positively impact the VC-investor's optimal equity 
share; moreover, by combining compound option pricing with sequential non-cooperative 
contracting in determining whether renegotiation improve the probability of coming to an 
agreement and proceed with the venture, they show that higher uncertainty leads to a larger 
stake in the venture, and renegotiation may result in a dramatic shift of control rights in the 
venture, while with low volatility, situations might occur where the VC-investor loses his first-
mover advantage. In joint ventures arrangements, interesting is the work of Cvitanić and Šikić 
(2011)4 that, by analyzing three contract designs: the risk-sharing, the timing-incentive and the 
asymmetric contract decisions design, they studied the optimal time for entering in a joint 
venture by two firms, and the optimal linear contract for sharing the profits. They found that 
that if the firms are risk-neutral and if the cash payments are allowed, all three designs are 
equivalent, while if at least one of the two firms is risk averse, the optimal contract parameters 
may vary significantly across the three designs and across varying levels of risk aversion. 
Finally, regarding the M&A operations, between the many (e.g. Benson and Ziedonis, 2009; 
Tong and Li, 2011) Lambrecht (2004) analyzes the timing of mergers motivated by economies 
of scale, showing as subsist an incentive to merge in periods of economic expansion, and that, 
by relaxing the assumption that firms are price takers, the market power strengthens the firms’ 
incentive to merge and speeds up merger activity; moreover, by comparing mergers with hostile 
takeovers, they show that the way merger synergies are divided not only influences the 
acquirer's and the acquiree's returns from merging, but also the timing of the restructuring. 
Given the large applicability of the subject, my work is thought as a connection between the 
standard real option theory (ROT) as presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) with the classical 
framework of vertical relationships, as treated by Tirole (1988) and more recently by others, 
between which: Chevalier-Roignant (2011) that combines the ROT with game theory in study 
the interactions among firms as competitors or potential collaborators, and Azevedo and Paxson 
(2014) that shows as an investment decision in a competitive market can be thought as a “game” 
in which firms are able to implicitly take into account the reactions of other firms in their own 
investment decision process. Among the many, the most closely related works I have identified 
                                                                
3 See also Vrande and Vanhaverbeke, (2013). 




are the publications of Zormpas D. (2017), Chan (2012), Lukas and Welling (2014) and de 
Villemeur Billette et al. (2013). The work of Zormpas D. (2017) consider a potential investor 
who contemplates entering an uncertain new market under the conditions to purchase a discrete 
input from an upstream firm and to interact with an investment partner who is willing to bear 
some of the investment costs. By using the ROA (real option approach), the paper shows as the 
involvement of any of the two alien agents causes the postponement of the investment and 
examines the synchronous effect of outsourcing and external funding both in a non-cooperative 
and in a cooperative (Nash bargaining solution) game-theoretic setting, highlighting as the 
endogeneity of the sunk investment cost affects the timing and the value of the option to invest. 
Chan (2012) explore a model regarding the supply chain management, acknowledging the fact 
that volatile market conditions cause the future cash flows along the supply chain more difficult 
to anticipate, so that the usual NVP approach may be hard to apply; for this reason they propose 
a two-stages dynamic optimization model by using a real option approach in which the supplier 
and the retailer cooperatively determine the optimal entry time, and, performing a sensitivity 
analyses, they investigate the impact that some critical factors (growth rate, volatility of demand 
shock, sunk cost, and relating operational costs) may have on both the option value and the 
investment threshold. Lukas and Welling (2014) by defining a model for the optimal timing in 
"climate-friendly" investments, enlarge the contribution of Chen (2012) by adopting a non-
cooperative real option game setting according to which the optimal timing is not decided 
jointly, but by one of the participating firms, moreover they provide a further extension of the 
previous model by allowing for the participation of more than two agents and showing that the 
supply chain becomes less efficient with every additional link as the timing distortion builds 
up. Finally, de Villemeur Billette et al. (2013), show as the standard analysis of vertical 
relationships transposes directly to investment dynamics, highlighting the fact that an 
investment not always is made in-house, but often may be conditioned to the furniture of a 
discrete input produced by an upstream supplier with market power, so that the cost of the 
investment is endogenous since it is determined by the vertical relationship between the 
potential investor and the external supplier.  
I my thesis I will analyze different cases in which a potential investor (that can be though as an 
innovative start-up) wants to enter in a new high growing market by investing in a project. To 
do this face the problem to decide when it is optimal to undertake the irreversible investment 
under a situation of uncertainty. I will use the real options approach in order to examine the 
interaction among: the firm who is contemplating entering in a new market (downstream firm), 
a firm who acts like an investment partner helping in financing the project in exchange of a 




who is responsible for the provision of an input that is necessary for the investment to take 
place. I will start providing different cases in which, progressively, more agents will be involved 
considering different type of interactions and comparing different game setting. Particularly, I 
will examine as, in the case in which there is the participation of an outside investment partner, 
the timing and the value for the potential investor may be affected depending on the role that 
the two takes with respect to each other. Moreover, I will provide also some innovative 
extensions. First, by taking into accounts the presence of competition between downstream 
firms or upstream firms, I will examine both a competitive and a collusive setting. Second, 
starting by the assumption that the investment produces positive social benefits, I will consider 
as the intervention of the policy maker can affect both the timing and the value of the potential 

























Chapter 1: Analysis of different investment scenarios. 
 
This first chapter of my thesis is focused on providing different case study in which at the center 
there is a potential investor willing to undertake an irreversible investment under uncertainty 
for which the participation of an investment partner helping by financing part of the project 
and/or the interaction with an upstream supplier providing a discrete input necessary to start the 
production, may be needed. Specifically, in section 1.1 I will examine the benchmark case 
under which the potential investor is able to produce the input in-house and has the resources 
to finance the project. In section 1.2 I will assume the discrete input will be provide by an 
upstream supplier but still the downstream firm has the finance resources to finance the 
investment. In section 1.3 I return to the case in which the input is produced in house, but with 
the difference that the start-up firm does not have the financial resources and so the participation 
of an investment partner is needed. In section 1.4 I examine how the involvement of the two 
alien agents can affects the investment timing and how the observed timing discrepancies are 
reflected in the value of the opportunity to invest. Finally, in section 1.5, I will make a 
comparison between cases comparing the different investment threshold and the value of the 
options to invest from the investor prospective. 
 
1.1. Benchmark/integrated case: Internal founding and internal 
input production. 
 
In the framework of a start-up firm willing to undertake a project, an investment in a discrete 
input is needed to operate on the final market. In this first section I will assume this input will 
be produced internally by the firm (integration case) and that the firm owns the financial 
resources to realize the project. 
Now, in line with the framework presented by Billette de Villlemeur (2013) I will provide some 
variable and assumptions that will be useful throughout the paper: 
 I denote the sunk cost of the investment and is assumed to be positive. 
 πM𝑌𝑡 represents the profit flows deriving from the investment, given that πM > 0 is the 
monopolistic profit per unit of  𝑌𝑡.  
 𝑌𝑡  is a positive scale parameter assumed to follow a geometric Brownian Motion with 
drift: 𝑑𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼𝑌𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑌𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡 , where the parameters 𝜎  and 𝛼  are both positive and 




the standard increment of a Winer process uncorrelated over time satisfying 𝐸[𝑑𝑊𝑡] =
0 and 𝐸[𝑊𝑡
2] = 𝑑𝑡. 
 The discount rate r is assumed to be larger than the expected growth rate of the market 
(𝑟 > 𝛼) 5. 
 A lower case 𝑦 = 𝑌0  is used to indicate the current level of the state variable and it is 
assumed the initial size of the market to be positive and with a value sufficiently small 
so that it is preferable to wait rather than to invest today. 
These assumptions are in line with the expression of the option value from McDonald and 
Siegel (1986) where the optimal investment strategy is thought as a trigger strategy in the sense 
that one should invest as soon as the value of a project is greater than a threshold, the value of 
which increases with uncertainty6. About this O’Brien et al. (2013) find empirical evidence 
about the fact that entrepreneurs take into account the value of the option to delay the investment 
when they are deciding to enter in a new market, so the potential investor will invest at the time 
in which the expected payoff derived from the project exceeds the investment cost by the option 
value of further postponing the investment in the future. With this background the startup firm 
is also assumed to be able to observe the current market size and so to decide when to invest 
and gain the subsequent profit flows.  
Given the previous assumption we have, following the standard real option framework by Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994), that the value of the investment opportunity (so the value of the option to 
invest) for the firm is represented by the maximization of the expected present value of the 
payoff (𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼) that it will be obtained at time T (time in which the investment occurs)
 7: 
 





r −  α













Yt  constitutes the value of the project and 𝑇 =
inf{t ≥ 0|𝑌𝑡 = 𝑦
∗} represent the random first time in which 𝑌𝑡 hits the barrier 𝑦
∗ that trigger 
the investment. In words, 𝑦∗ represent the time in which the market size reaches the width 
                                                                
5  Otherwise, for  𝑟 ≤ 𝛼  the firm may have no incentive to undertake the project and delay indefinitely the 
investment. 
6 Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 




needed to make the firm willing to exercise its option to invest in the project. While β is a 
function of parameters8: 

















  (2) 
In Appendix 1.1b I show the sensitivity analysis of 𝛽(𝛼, 𝜎, 𝑟), what it is important to observe 
here is that the function of parameters 𝛽 is  > 1 and it is increasing in r and decreasing both in 
𝜎 and 𝛼. Note moreover that the assumption made regarding 𝛼 < 𝑟 it guarantees convergence. 
With this background, by solving the maximization problem (1) it is possible to retrieve the 






𝐼  (3) 
Note that  𝑦∗  is increasing in the sunk investment cost I and in the volatility 𝜎 (though the 
function of parameters 𝛽 ) but it is decreasing in the present value of the profit flow 
𝜋𝑀
𝑟− 𝛼
 . In 
practice this means that it does worth more to hold an investment option with high strike price 
(represented by I), high underlying asset volatility (𝜎) and small return (
𝜋𝑀
𝑟− 𝛼
), rather than 
exercise it.  By substitution, we have that the value of the option to invest at the value 









  (4) 
Note that, in this case, because we assumed the firm is able to undertake the project on its own, 
and the investment it is undertaken in a completely new market this value corresponds also to 
the value of the industry, as such in the integrate case we have only one player. 
 
1.2. Separated case: Internal founding and external input 
production. 
 
In this section I will examine a case in which the production of the discrete input needed in 
order to undertake the investment and the decision about the investment timing are made by 
                                                                
8 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) Ch. 5 or Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis (2010), Ch. 11-12. 




two different firms10. For simplicity I will call A the downstream firm that make the investment 
decision and B the upstream firm that will provide the input. It is important to point out that, as 
input producer, B do not observe the magnitude of the downstream market size and its only 
choice consists on the determination of the input price (𝑝1) that, once chosen, is taken as 
constant. Moreover, as in Tirole (1988) is the supplier that chooses the contract, so A is assumed 
to be the price taker.  
Now, by moving backwards, taking into consideration the price (𝑝1), A observes the current 
market size and decides the optimal investment threshold 𝑦1. Then B, accounting for the timing 
chosen by A, sets the 𝑝1. So, I start analyzing the optimization problem of A, and considering 
that now the costs of the investment are represented by  𝑝1, we have: 
  𝑉𝐴1(𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦1(𝑝1) (
𝜋𝑀
𝑟 −  𝛼





  (5) 
Because the (5) is very similar to the (1) following the same procedure of Appendix 1.1c it is 






𝑝1  (6) 
Note that the only difference between the investment threshold in the integrated case and the 
one in the above expression, consists in the fact that in the latter the costs sustained by A are 
no more equal to the pure investment cost (I), but instead they are defined by the price set by 
the supplier. Moreover, note that 𝑦1(𝑝1) is increasing in 𝑝111, so that for a higher price payed 
the potential investor will delay the project’s realization.  
By proceeding now with the decision problem of B, the supplier will provide the discrete input 
needed to the investment and in exchange will receive 𝑝1 from A. So that the maximization 
problem of B is simply reduced to the following:  





  (7) 
By solving for 𝑝1 yelds
12: 
                                                                
10 As in Billette de Villemeur et al. (2013). 
11 Note that when 𝑝1 = 𝐼, B charges the input cost and the firm will invest at the same investment trigger of the 
integrated case in Section 1.1.   







𝐼  (8) 
Note that 𝑝1 it is always greater than I, given that by construction 𝛽 > 1 . This makes sense, in 
fact in order to gain a positive payoff, B has to charge for the furniture of the input a price 
greater than the costs sustained to produce it. Now, substituting the (8) back into the (6) the 




𝑦∗  (9) 
From which it is trivial note that 𝑦1(𝑝1) >  𝑦
∗. So, in the case in which there is the presence of 
an upstream firm providing the input, the optimal investment trigger will be higher so that the 
investment will be delayed with respect the benchmark case in Section 1.1. It is interesting also 
to note that both 𝑦1 and 𝑝1 are decreasing in 𝛽 and so are increasing in the volatility (σ), this 
means that A will tend to give up very risky projects or delay them as much as possible. The 
same effect holds also for α, with the intuition that if A expects higher market growth rate in 
the future then it will be inclined to wait more before to enter in the market. From a 
mathematical point of view this can be seen by the fact that the lim
𝛽→1
𝑦1(𝑝1) →  ∞.  
Now, substituting back the (9) and the (8) in the expression for the value of the option to invest 
for the A, we obtain:13: 





  (10) 
The above expression tells us that the option to invest in the integrated case has higher value 





is in the 
interval (0;1). So, the presence of a supplier providing the input has the effect to both delay the 
investment and to reduce the value of the option of A. Now, regarding B, by substituting 𝑝1 into 
the expression for 𝑉𝐵1(𝑦), the value for the supplier is given by: 





  (11) 
From which it is easy to see that the value of the option to invest for A is higher than the value 










                                                                




bigger than 𝑉𝐵1(𝑦), and this difference depends to the function of parameters 𝛽 (so from the 
magnitude of volatility, expected market growth and discount rate). Indeed, as 𝛽 increases the 
distance between the two decreases14.   
Now, by taking the sum of the values of the two agents it is possible to analyze the situation 
from an industry prospective: 




𝛽 2𝛽 − 1
𝛽 − 1
  (12) 
Now, by comparing the (12) with the value of the industry in the benchmark case, and given 






 is positive but < 1, we have that the introduction of a 
supplier in the industry leads to a lower value from an industry prospective. In fact, the presence 
of B increases the optimal investment threshold for the firm A though the effect of 𝑝1 and at 
the same time it reduces its value of the option to invest. Moreover, the value added from B to 
the industry is not enough to compensate for the reduction in the value of A, so that the industry 
value in the integrated case results to be higher.    
 
1.3. External funding case: external founding and internal input 
production. 
 
In this section I start by the case presented in section 1.1 (vertical integration), with the 
difference that here I will assume that the start-up firm does not have the financial resources to 
undertake the project. So, as in Chesbrough and Schwartz (2007), that reports as the timely 
investments demands in many cases too much resources for a single, the participation of an 
investment partner willing to bear part of the costs in exchange of a share of the returns is 
usually requested. Now, referring to the start-up firm as A and to the outside investor as C, I 
assume two different scenarios in which the two subjects enter in a leader-follower game. In 
line with Robert and Berry (1985), the frameworks that I will develop can be thought as a 
corporate VC that takes a minority equity stake in a relatively new start up, with the aim to 
value early-stage projects. So, in section 1.3.1 I will assume C is the game leader that submit 









the compensation offer and A is the game follower that decides the timing for the investment15. 
This framework it’s more appropriate in cases in which the project is highly innovative or very 
desirable, so that the investment partner makes the first step declaring his interest to invest. 
While in subsection 1.3.2 I will treat a case similar to the one described by Lukas and Welling 
(2014), in which C takes the role of game follower (deciding the timing) and A is the game 
leader deciding the compensation share. 
 
1.3.1. Investment partner as game-leader and potential investor as 
game-follower. 
 
In the following A and C are assumed to negotiate on the equity share that the former has to 
give to the latter. Specifically, C is assumed to make an offer at time zero for helping in 
financing the project in exchange of a participation share 𝛾𝐹 ∈ (0,1) while A has the option to 
accept and immediately undertake the project or to wait. In other word C will decide the 
compensation offer and A will choose the optimal timing for the investment taking in 
consideration the share 𝛾𝐹. 
Going backwards, I start analyzing the choice of A, that sets the optimal investment threshold 
by solving the following maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) ((1 − 𝛾𝐹)
  𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼





  (13) 
With 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) and representing the exogenously given share of investment cost payed by C in 
order to participate in a share 𝛾𝐹  of the future profits deriving from the project. From the 
solution of the (13) we get16: 
   𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) = (
1 − 𝜃
1 − 𝛾𝐹
) 𝑦∗  (14) 
That represents the optimal investment threshold that once reached from below it triggers the 
investment. As one can expect,  𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) is increasing in 𝛾𝐹 and decreasing in 𝜃17. In words this 
                                                                
15 Similar framework is presented in Cvitanić J, Radas S, Šikić H. (2011). 
16 See appendix 1.3.1.a. for the calculation. 

















means that in order to anticipate the investment it is necessary that C participates in a higher 
share of the costs, while the investment will be delayed as the compensation share increases. C 
is facing a dilemma, in fact a high compensation leads to higher return but the cash-in will be 
delayed, whereas low compensation implies low returns but with shorter waiting period. Given 
that the investment partner takes in consideration the timing chosen by A, the compensation 
offer will be derived by the solution of the maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐶2








  (15) 
From which we have that the optimal compensation share required by C in order to participate 
in a share  𝜃 of the costs, is given by18: 
   𝛾𝐹 =
1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
  (16) 
As ones can expect 𝛾𝐹 is increasing in 𝜃 and decreasing in 𝛽 
19, this means that a higher level 
of the cost share payed by C, will correspond to a higher compensation required by the 
investment partner. Moreover, through the effect of 𝛽, an increase in the expected volatility 
will increase the compensation share, while an increase in the discount factor and in the 
expected market growth will reduce 𝛾𝐹. This makes sense, in facts for riskier project an investor 
will demand more return, while for higher expected growth in the market a lower share can be 
enough for the investment partner in order to participate. 
Now, by substituting back the (16) in the (14) we can write the optimal threshold as: 
  𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) = (
𝛽 − 𝜃
𝛽 − 1
) 𝑦∗  (17) 
Note that the terms (
𝛽−𝜃
𝛽−1
) is >1 given that by construction 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), so the investment will be 
delayed with respect to the benchmark case presented in Section 1.1. Moreover, interesting 
enough   𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) is decreasing both in 𝛽 and in 𝜃. So here there are two effects regarding 𝜃: the 
first one is given by the fact that 
𝑑 𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹)
𝑑𝜃
< 0 so increasing the share of the costs payed by C 
will have a direct effect on  𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) that will lead to an anticipation of the investment by A, 
while the second effect is the one previously seen, for which an increasing in the share of the 
                                                                
18 See Appendix 1.3.1.b. for calculations. 
















costs covered by C leads to an higher compensation (𝛾𝐹) that increases 𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) and so delay 
the project. These two have opposite effects, however given that 𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) > 𝑦
∗, overall we can 
say that the introduction of an investment partner in the framework analyzed induce to a 
postponing in the project with respect the benchmark case.    
Now, regarding the value of the option to invest for the two agents involved, by substituting the 
(16) and (17) into the equation for  𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) and 𝑉𝐶2
𝐹 (𝑦) we obtain: 
 𝑉𝐴2





𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (18) 
And: 
 𝑉𝐶2





𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (19) 
Note that, because (
𝛽−1
𝛽−𝜃
) < 1 (given that the investment partner is assumed to cover only a 
share of the costs, so that 𝜃 < 1), none of the above expression are greater than the value of the 
option to invest in the benchmark case. So in the case where the completion of the project 
depends on the participation of an agent providing funding, the investment not only will be 
delayed (𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) > 𝑦
∗) but the potential investor’s option to invest will be less valuable with 
respect to the integrated benchmark case: 𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦).  
Now, regarding the industry prospective, by adding the value of the two player we have: 
 𝑉2
𝐹(𝑦) = 𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) + 𝑉𝐶2
𝐹 (𝑦) = (𝛽 − 1)𝛽−1 [
2𝛽 − 1 − 𝜃𝛽
(𝛽 − 𝜃)𝛽
] 𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (20) 
From which the industry value results to be lower than the benchmark case, in fact being 
(𝛽 − 1)𝛽−1 [
2𝛽−1−𝜃𝛽
(𝛽−𝜃)𝛽
] positive but less than one, we have that when the presence of an outside 
investor is needed the industry value is lower than in the integrated case. This has to do with 
the fact that the delay of the project caused by the interaction between A and C, leads to a 
reduction in the value of A: 𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) and at the same time the value of C is not enough 
to compensate for this loss of value: 𝑉𝐶2
𝐹 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) − 𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦). 
 






In this second sub-section, similarly to the previous one, I will assume that the two players 
engage in a leader-following game, but here the roles will be reversed: A takes the role of game 
leader and at time zero makes a compensation offer represented by the share 𝛾𝐿 ∈ (0,1) to C, 
while C as game follower, taking into account the proposal of A, has the option to accept 
immediately the offer and to pay straightaway an exogenously given share of the costs needed 
to the project 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), or it can wait and postpone the contribution. This framework is in line 
with the one of Lukas and Welling (2014) in which an investment partner is assumed to be 
willing to participate in a given share of the sunk costs 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) in exchange of receiving a 
fraction of the project 𝛾𝐿 ∈ (0,1).  
By going backwards, I now start analyzing the problem of C, that taking into consideration the 
offer of A, decides the optimal timing of the investment by solving the following maximization 
problem: 
 𝑉𝐶2








  (21) 




𝑦∗  (22) 
As one can see from the above equation 𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) is decreasing in the compensation share
21 
offered by A, while is increasing in the in the exogenous share of costs that is required to C in 
order to participate in the investment22. This is intuitively right, in fact higher are costs that C 
will have to pay, and more the investment will be delayed. While, on the other hands, for a 
higher compensation offered by A, the investment partner will be willing to anticipate the 
investment. Note in fact from the (22) that for 𝜃 = 𝛾𝐿 the investment will be undertaken at the 
same time than in the integrated benchmark case: 𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) = 𝑦
∗. Consequently it is easy to see 
as A is facing a dilemma: on one hand it can offer a lower share of the profits so that to retrain 
a greater compensation for himself, but this will delay the implementation of the project and so 
also the generation of the returns, while on the other hands it can offer a higher compensation 
                                                                
20 See Appendix 1.3.2.a for the calculations. 







∗ < 0 










to the investment partner that so shortens the waiting period, but at the cost of give up a higher 
share of profits.  
The above considerations indeed are taken into account by the potential investor, that so sets 
the compensation offer by solving the following maximization problem:  
 𝑉𝐴2
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝛾𝐿 ((1 − 𝛾𝐿)
  𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼





  (23) 
From which yields23: 
 𝛾𝐿 =
𝜃(𝛽 − 1)
𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1
  (24) 
Note that the optimal compensation that A is willing to offer to C depends both on 𝜃 and 𝛽. 
More precisely a higher share of the costs paid by C leads the potential investor to offer a higher 
compensation in order to anticipate the investment, but this has a limit, in facts also for higher 
value of 𝜃 it is never optimal for A to offer a share  𝛾𝐿 > 𝜃. Regarding the effect of 𝛽, we have 
that 𝛾𝐿 is increasing in 𝛽, this is important because it means that an increasing in the volatility 
(σ) or in the drift of the stochastic scale parameter (α) will lead to a decrease in the optimal 
share offered by A, while at the contrary an increase in the interest rate (r) increases the 𝛾𝐿. 
Now, by substituting the (24) inside the (22) we obtain: 
 𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) =
𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1
𝛽 − 1
𝑦∗  (25) 
From which we can see as the optimal investment threshold decided by C is decreasing in 𝛽24 
and is always higher than the threshold set in the integrated case 𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) > 𝑦
∗, given 𝜃 > 0 by 
construction. Note moreover that, and as we seen before, for a higher 𝜃 we have a double effect 
on the timing: through 𝛾𝐿 we can expect an increasing in the compensation offer by A and so 
an anticipation of the investment while if we examine the effect directly on 𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) we have that 
an higher cost share leads to a longer waiting period. The reason is that while 𝛾𝐿 is a concave 
function of 𝜃 , the optimal investment threshold is a linear increasing function of the cost 
                                                                
23 See appendix 1.3.2.b to the calculations. 










share25, so also if the compensation offer increase, in real terms it worsens, in fact what A is 
giving up by offering a higher 𝛾𝐿 it is not remunerated by a shorter waiting period.  
Now, substituting the (25) and (24) into the equation for the value of the option to invest for 
the potential investor and the investment partner we have respectively: 
 𝑉𝐴2
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) (
𝛽 − 1
  𝜃 +  𝛽 − 1
)
𝛽−1
  (26) 
And: 
 𝑉𝐶2
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) (
𝛽 − 1
  𝜃 +  𝛽 − 1
)
𝛽
𝜃  (27) 
As we can see, in line with the fact that the investment is postponed the value for the potential 
investor is lower than in the integrated case: 𝑉𝐴2
𝐿 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) , recalling that 𝜃 > 0 and 𝛽 > 1. 
So, similarly to the previous section we have that the introduction of an investment partner has 
the effect not only to delay the realization of the project, but also to lower the value of the option 
to invest for the potential investor, and this is independent from the role chosen by the two agent 
in the leader-following game examined. 
Now, analyzing the situation from an industry prospective, we have that the overall value of 
the industry is given by: 
 𝑉2
𝐿(𝑦) = 𝑉𝐴2
𝐿 (𝑦) + 𝑉𝐶2
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) (
𝛽 − 1




 𝜃𝛽 + 𝛽 − 1
   𝛽 − 1
)  (28) 
Note that for 𝜃 = 0, so basically in the case there is no participation by the investment partner 
in the costs of the project, the value is reduced to the one analyzed in the benchmark case. While 
for higher values of 𝜃, we have that the industry value is decrease, and this means that the value 
added by C to the industry is not enough to compensate for the loss of value that A has on its 
option with respect to the integrated case. 
 
1.4. Three-agent case: external founding and external input 
production. 
 
                                                                










In this section I put together the situations examined in sections 1.2 and 1.3. So, I will consider 
the case in which the potential investor (A) is not capable to produce the input required for the 
investment and at the same time does not have enough financial resources at his disposal. As 
consequence of this A will have to interact both with an outside supplier (B) and with an 
investment partner (C) in order to undertake the project. Now, providing that B will be always 
considered as game-leader, also here I will analyze different scenarios. In section 1.4.1. I will 
assume A as time deciding agents and that C submit the compensation offer to participate in a 
share of the costs of the investment. While in section 1.4.2. the roles will be reverted: A will 
decide the compensation share to submit to C that in turn will set the investment timing. In both 
cases, keeping in mind that both A and C are assumed to be able to observe continuously the 
magnitude of 𝑌𝑡  (while the knowledge of B is limited to the structural parameters of the 
stochastic process), I will show as the presence of the three agents will affect the timing and the 
value of the option to invest from the point of view of the potential investor. 
 
1.4.1. Three-agent case with the potential investor as time deciding 
agent.  
 
Starting with the situation in which the potential investor takes the role of time deciding agent, 
the three players are assumed to follow these steps: 
I. Player B chooses the optimal price (𝑝3
𝐹) that is willing to take in order to provide the 
furniture of the discrete input. 
II. Given the choice of B, C decides optimally the compensation share (𝛾3
𝐹) that is willing 
to take in order to participate in an exogenously given share (𝜃) of the investment costs. 




𝐹)), and so the time at which the investment will occur. 
Now, by proceeding backwards, I will start with examine first the optimization problem of 
player A and after the choices of the other two subjects.  
Starting with the potential investor, the optimal investment threshold is given by the solution 
of the following maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐴3




















Note that the above expression is similar to the (13) in section 1.3.1, the only difference is that 
now the investment costs are represented by the price 𝑝3
𝐹 necessary to acquire the furniture of 











𝑦∗  (30) 
So, by taking into account the compensation set by the investment partner and the price of the 




𝐹) is reached from below. Note that the expression for 𝑦3
𝐹(𝛾3
𝐹, 𝑝3
𝐹) is similar to the one 
of 𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) in section 1.3.1., in fact if we consider the case in which 𝑝3
𝐹 = 𝐼  we obtain exactly 
the (14). Given this, the same considerations made in Section 1.3.1 holds also for this case, with 
the difference that now the total costs for investing in the project are represented by 𝑝3
𝐹. 
Proceeding backward the optimal compensation offer made by C is derived by the solution of 
the following maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐶3
















  (31) 
Solving we get27: 
 𝛾3
𝐹 =
1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
  (32) 
Note that holds the same result as in section 1.3.1, in fact the investment partner do not care 
about the presence of B, and requires a compensation share that it’s independent from the cost 
of the input. Recall that, as previously seen, the compensation share is increasing in 𝜃 and 
decreasing in 𝛽.  
Finally, the upstream supplier anticipates the choice of the other two players, and it sets the 
optimal price for the furniture of the discrete input by solving the following maximization 
problem: 
 𝑉𝐵3
𝐹 (𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝3𝐹
(𝑝3








  (33) 
                                                                
26 Note that the procedure to retrieve 𝑦3
𝐹(𝛾3
𝐹 , 𝑝3
𝐹) is the same as the one used in section 1.3.1. to get 𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹). See 
Appendix 1.3.1.a. 
27 The procedure to obtain 𝛾3




 Note that, the value of the option to invest of B it is independent from the presence of an 





𝐼  (34) 
That it’s equal to the optimal price retrieved in Section 1.2. The intuition here is simple, the 
outside supplier does not care the way in which the project is financed as long as the price for 
the furniture of the input is payed. Note moreover that, though the effect of 𝛽, higher volatility 
(σ) lead to higher price, and the same holds also for the expected growth in the market (α)28.  








𝑦∗  (35) 
Note that the terms  
𝛽(𝛽−𝜃)
(𝛽−1)2
 is greater than one given that 𝛽 > 1 and  𝜃 < 1 by construction, so 
as one can expect, the introduction of two agents leads to a postponement of the project with 




decreasing in 𝜃29, this is intuitive, in fact more the investment partner participates in the costs 
of the project and earlier this will be undertaken by A.    
Now, substituting the optimal investment threshold obtained in the (35) into the equations for 
the value of the option to invest of the three agents, we obtain: 
 𝑉𝐴3










𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (36) 
 𝑉𝐵3










𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (37) 
 𝑉𝐶3










𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (38) 
From these last equations we can observe that in the case in which the project’s completion is 
subordinated to the presence of both an outside supplier (B) producing the input and an 
                                                                
28 As reported in de Villemeur Billette et al. (2013) the drift (α) of the stochastic scale parameter 𝑌𝑡 can be thought 
as the market’s expected growth rate. 

















𝐹) > 𝑦∗) and at the same time to reduce the value of the option to 
invest for the potential investor (A). Note in fact that 𝑉𝐴3
𝐹 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) given 𝛽 > 1 and 𝜃 < 1. 





𝐹 (𝑦) + 𝑉𝐵3

















Note that, the (39) is always lower than the value of the industry in the benchmark case, in fact 

















] is always lower than 
1. This means that the additional value given by the introduction of two more agents in the 
industry is not sufficient to compensate for the decreasing in value in the option to invest for 
A:  𝑉𝐵3
𝐹 (𝑦) + 𝑉𝐶3
𝐹 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) − 𝑉𝐴3
𝐹 (𝑦). 
 
1.4.2. Three-agent case with the investment partner as time 
deciding agent.  
 
In this second sub-section I will invert the roles of the investment partner (C) and the potential 
investor (A). I will so expand the framework analyzed in sub-section 1.3.2 by considering now 
that in order to undertake the project A will have to acquire the input from an upstream supplier 
(B). So, by considering C as time deciding agent, the three players are assumed to interact 
following these steps: 
I. Player B chooses the optimal price (𝑝3
𝐿) that is willing to receive in order to provide the 
furniture of the discrete input. 
II. Given the choice of B, A decides optimally the compensation share (𝛾3
𝐿) that is willing 
to offer to C in order to have him participating in an exogenously given share (𝜃) of the 
investment costs. 
III. Finally, given both the choice of B and A, C will choose the optimal time to accept the 
offer and to provide the funds needed to the acquisition of the input, determining so the 







By starting from the behavior of the investment partner, the optimal investment threshold is 
given by the solution of the following maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐶3
















  (40) 
Note that the above expression is similar to the (21) in section 1.3.2, the only difference is that 
now the costs payed by C are represented by 𝜃𝑝3











𝑦∗  (41) 
So, by taking into account the compensation offer made by the potential investor and the price 
for the furniture of the input as given, the investment partner will provide the funds needed to 
the project when the optimal threshold 𝑦3
𝐿(𝛾3
𝐿, 𝑝3
𝐿) is reached from below. Here it is easy to see 
as if the compensation share (𝛾3
𝐿) and the share of the costs payed by C (𝜃) are equal, the 
investment will be anyway postponed with respect to the benchmark case in Section 1.1 
proportionally with the magnitude of the price 𝑝3
𝐿 necessary to pay the furniture of the input. 
This highlight the impact of presence of the outside supplier (B) that, as we had seen in section 
1.2, in order to have positive profit will charge a price for the furniture greater than the pure 
costs I, leading so to a further delay in the project. Note moreover that, similarly to the (22) the 
investment threshold is increasing in 𝜃 and decreasing in 𝛾3
𝐿, this makes sense in fact higher are 
the costs to sustain for C, and more time usually it takes to provide the funds, while on the other 
hands higher is the compensation share and more the investment partner is impatient to 
undertake the investment. 
Proceeding backward the potential investor, anticipates the choice of C about the timing and 
set the compensation offer as the solution of the following maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐴3
















  (42) 




𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1
  (43) 
                                                                
30 Note that the procedure to retrieve 𝑦3
𝐿(𝛾3
𝐿 , 𝑝3





Note that holds the same result as the (24) in section 1.3.2, in fact given the exogeneity of the 
share costs (𝜃), the potential investor do not care about the presence of B, and so it requires a 
compensation share that it’s independent from the cost of the input.  
Finally, the upstream supplier anticipates the choice of the other two agents and set the optimal 
price for the furniture of the discrete input by solving the following maximization problem: 
 𝑉𝐶3
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝3𝐿
(𝑝3








  (44) 
 Note that, the value of the option to invest for B it is independent from the presence of an 





𝐼  (45) 
That it’s equal to the optimal price retrieved in Section 1.2. where C was missing. In fact, the 
outside supplier does not care the way in which the project is financed as long as the price for 
the furniture of the input is totally payed. Note moreover that, though the effect of 𝛽31, higher 
volatility (σ) and higher expected growth in the market (α) lead both to a higher price. 
Now, by substituting the (43), (45) into the (41) we have that the optimal investment threshold 





𝛽(𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1)
(𝛽 − 1)2
𝑦∗  (46) 
From the above expression it is possible to note as the terms  
𝛽(𝜃+𝛽−1)
(𝛽−1)2
> 1, given that 𝜃 > 0 
and 𝛽 > 1 by construction. So, similarly to the previous section where the roles of A and C 
were reverted, also in this framework the introduction of two more agents leads to a delay in 
the project with respect to the integrated case (section 1.1.).  




𝐹) in the previous section, the optimal investment threshold is increasing in 𝜃32, on the 
other hands an higher costs share (𝜃) leads also to an higher compensation offer by A that 
should result in a shorter waiting period. The reason lies on the fact that while 𝛾3
𝐿 is a concave 
function of 𝜃, 𝑦3
𝐿(𝛾3
𝐿 , 𝑝3
𝐿) is a linear function of 𝜃, so in real terms an increase in the cost share 
                                                                





















worsen the situation: what A sacrifice giving up a higher share of the future profits is not 
compensated by sufficient acceleration of the investment. This is the same reasoning made in 
section 1.3.2 where the input was internally produced, with the only difference that here, 
because of the presence of B, the effect on the timing is exacerbated. Note in fact that by 
comparing the slopes of 𝑦3
𝐿(𝛾3
𝐿 , 𝑝3
𝐿) and 𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) with respect to 𝜃, we have that the former is 
𝛽
1−𝛽
  times greater than the latter33 and that the terms 
𝛽
1−𝛽
 represent what the supplier charges on 
the price to provide the furniture of the input. 
Now, by substituting the (43), (45) and (46) into the equations of the values of the option to 
invest for the three agents, we obtain: 
 𝑉𝐴3
𝐿 (𝑦) = (
𝛽 − 1








𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (47) 
 𝑉𝐵3
𝐿 (𝑦) = (
𝛽 − 1








𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (48) 
 𝑉𝐶3
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝜃 (
𝛽 − 1








𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (49) 
From the above expressions it is easy to observe that when the realization of the project is 
subordinated by the presence of both an investment partner (C) helping in financing the project 
and a supplier (B) providing the furniture of the input, this leads to a delay in the investment 
with respect to the benchmark case in section 1.1 (𝑦3
𝐿(𝛾3
𝐿 , 𝑝3
𝐿) > 𝑦∗) and at the same times it 
reduces the value of the option to invest for the potential investor (A)34.  
Finally, analyzing the situation from an industry prospective, summing up the (47), (48) and 




𝐿 (𝑦) + 𝑉𝐵3

















The above expression represents the value generated in the industry by the project. Note as this 
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this means that the additional value given by the introduction of two more agents in the industry 
is not sufficient to compensate for the decreasing in value in the option to invest for A:  
𝑉𝐵3
𝐿 (𝑦) + 𝑉𝐶3
𝐿 (𝑦) < 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) − 𝑉𝐴3























Chapter 2: Comparison between cases.  
 
In this second chapter of my thesis I will sum up the main results obtained from the previous 
sections of Chapter 1 and I will compare the different cases both from a timing and a value 
prospective. The sections are organized as follows: in Section 2.1 I will recall the main results 
about the timing of the investment, making some consideration between the different situations 
analyzed, in Section 2.2 I will sum up the finding about the value of the option to invest both 
from a potential investor (A) and from an industry prospective, finally in Section 2.3, I will run 
a simulation using the MATLAB compiler, in order to give a better sense of the magnitude of 
the changing between the different cases.  
 
2.1. Analysis on the investment timing. 
 
In this first section I will proceed by analyzing the results about the optimal investment 
threshold obtained in the previous chapter. Recall that this threshold is the one that, ones 
reached from below trigger the investment in the project, so a higher threshold implies a longer 
waiting period, while for lower values we will have an anticipation of the project. The following 
table sum up the major results in Chapter 1: 










External Funding Case:  





External Funding Case:  
(Investment partner as time deciding agent) 
𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿) =

























Recalling that 𝛽 > 1, we can easily observe as an increase in the number of agents involved 
leads to a delay of the project with respect to the optimal threshold in the Integrated/Benchmark 
case in Section 1.1. of Chapter 1. So, generally, we can report the following ranking: 







As we can see, more interesting is to analyze the timing in the cases in which the numbers of 
players involved are the same, note in fact that in both the “External Funding Case” and the 
“Three-gent Case” we have analyzed two different framework. First, in Sections 1.3.1 and 
1.4.1, I have assumed the investment partner (C) submit the compensation offer to the potential 
investor (A) that decides the timing of the investment. Second, in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.4.2, I 
have reverted the roles of the two players, so considered A as the agent setting the compensation 
offer and C deciding the optimal timing for the disbursement of the funds needed to undertake 
the investment. As one can note in what reported on the table above, the effect that the 
exogenously given share of the costs (𝜃) has on the ranking of the timing depends on the 
framework analyzed. In fact, recalling that we assumed 0 < 𝜃 < 1, by comparing the two 














𝛽 − 1 + 𝜃
⋚ 1 
So, from a timing prospective, we have that for 0 < 𝜃 <
1
2
  it is more convenient for the 
potential investor to set the compensation offer and to let the investment partner decide the 
timing. In this case the ranking becomes:  







While for  
1
2
< 𝜃 < 1 the potential investor accelerates the realization of the project by taking 
the role of time deciding agent. In this case the ranking becomes: 







Note however that for 𝜃 =
1
2
  we will have that the potential investor will be indifferent in the 
role to pick up, in fact in this case we will have that the investment threshold will be the same, 








Another useful observation about the timing can be sought by noting that where there are two 
agents, in order to anticipate the investment, it is always preferable for the potential investor 




investment threshold by the same coefficient 
𝛽
𝛽−1
. This has to do with the fact that first, as 
already seen, B do not care in which way the project is financed as long as A pays the price for 
the furniture, second this is the amount that the upstream firm charges on the “pure costs” (I) 
given that it has the monopoly on the discrete input. As we will see in the next Chapter things 
may change in the case there is a competitor that is also able to provide the furniture to A.  
 
2.2. Analysis on the value of the option to invest. 
 
In this section I will procced by analyzing the result obtained in Chapter 1, providing some 
consideration both from an individual prospective and from an industry prospective.  
By starting to analyze the situation form the single agents prospective, we have that, by studying 
the values of the options to invest derived in Chapter 1, for the different players involved it is 
possible to establish the following ranking:  
Agent A 𝑉𝐼(y) > 𝑉𝐴2
𝐿 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐴1(𝑦) > 𝑉𝐴3
𝐿 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐴3
𝐹 (𝑦) 
Agent B 𝑉𝐵1(𝑦) > (𝑉𝐵3
𝐹 (𝑦) ⋚ 𝑉𝐵3
𝐿 (𝑦)) 
Agent C 𝑉𝐶2
𝐹 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐶3
𝐹 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐶2
𝐿 > 𝑉𝐶3
𝐿 (𝑦) 
As we can see from the above table, some interesting considerations can be made.  
Regarding the potential investor (A), first note that an increase in the number of agents involved 
leads to a delay in the project (as reported in the previous section), but not always leads to a 
lower value of the option to invests. In facts, also if the integrated case is the most favorable 
and the separated case is always better than the cases in which all three players are involved, 
we can see as, from a value prospective, the situation in which  A takes the role of leader in the 
relation with the investment partner, is always preferable than the case where A is the game 
follower, no matter if there is or not the additional presence of B. In other word, we have that 
by considering A as time deciding agent (as in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1) the value of the option 
to invest for the potential investor is always lower than the case in which A set the compensation 
offer (as in sections 1.3.2 and 1.4.2) even if in the former scenario we take the situation in which 
only two players are involved, versus the latter case in which all three agents are considered. 
Moreover, note that these consideration holds independently from the exogenously given share 




Regarding the outside supplier (B), we can see how the increasing in the number of agents 
involved (so as the additional presence of the investment partner) has the effect to both delay 
the investment and to reduce the value of the option to invest. Anyway, when we consider the 
presence of all three players, the ranking of the value of B depends indirectly also on the type 
of relation between the investment partner and the potential investor. Indeed, on one hand, for 
a given share of the investment costs (0 < 𝜃 <
1
2
) covered by C, the value of the option of B 
is higher in the case in which A takes the role of game leader in interacting with C 
(𝑉𝐵3
𝐿 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐵3




< 𝜃 < 1), the value of the option of B is higher in the case in which A takes the role of 
game follower (𝑉𝐵3
𝐹 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐵3
𝐿 (𝑦)). This is coherent with the ranking of the timing made in the 
previous section, in fact a delay of the investment for B means a longer waiting period before 
start collecting the profits from the selling of the discrete input to the potential investor. 
Regarding the investment partner (C), we can analyze the situation by two different points of 
view. First, if we consider that the type of interaction between A and C does not change, the 
addition of an outside supplier providing the furniture of the input leads generally to a delay of 
the investment and so to a lower value of the option to invest for the investment partner. Second, 
if we compare the type of interaction between the investment partner and the potential investor, 
we can see that it is always preferable for C to set the optimal compensation offer for participate 
in a given share of the investment costs, letting so A deciding the timing of the investment, all 
this independently from the presence of B.  
Analyzing now the situation from an industry prospective, the following table sum up the major 
results obtained in Chapter 1: 











𝛽 2𝛽 − 1
𝛽 − 1
𝑉𝐼(𝑦) 
External Funding Case:  
(Potential investor as time deciding 
agent) 
𝑉2
𝐹(𝑦) = (𝛽 − 1)𝛽−1 [
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(𝛽 − 𝜃)𝛽
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External Funding Case:  
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By comparing the value of the industry in the different cases on table above, it is possible to 
obtain the following general ranking: 
𝑉𝐼(y) > (𝑉2
𝐹(𝑦) ⋚ 𝑉2
𝐿(𝑦)) > 𝑉1(𝑦) > (𝑉3
𝐹(𝑦) ⋚ 𝑉3
𝐿(𝑦)) 
In line with what we have seen in the comparison between the investment thresholds, generally 
an increase in the number of players involved in the realization of the project leads to a delay 
of the investment and, as we can see from above, to a lower industry value. Again, the most 
favorable scenario is represented by the benchmark case analyzed in section 1.1 of Chapter 1. 
Moreover, when two players are considered, we can observe that it is always preferable to 
interact with an investment partner rather than with an outside supplier. Interesting is the 
comparison of the situations presented in Section 1.3.1 and Section 1.4.1 (where the potential 
investor takes the role of game follower in the interaction with the investment partner) with 
those evaluated respectively in Section 1.3.2 and Section 1.4.2 (where the role of the two agents 
are reverted). Here the analysis is similar to the one made for the investment timing: for values 
of the exogenously given share of the costs (𝜃) covered by the investment partner between zero 
and one-half we have that the realization of the project is anticipated if A takes the role of time 
deciding agent (as in Section 1.3.1 and Section 1.4.1), consequently in this case the above 
ranking will be: 
𝑉𝐼(y) > 𝑉2
𝐹(𝑦) > 𝑉2
𝐿(𝑦) > 𝑉1(𝑦) > 𝑉3
𝐹(𝑦) > 𝑉3
𝐿(𝑦) 
While for values of 𝜃 between one-half and one, the things are reverted and the anticipation of 
the investment will occurs in the cases in which the potential investor sets the compensation 
offer (as in Section 1.3.2 and 1.4.2), so the ranking will be: 
𝑉𝐼(y) > 𝑉2
𝐿(𝑦) > 𝑉2
𝐹(𝑦) > 𝑉1(𝑦) > 𝑉3
𝐿(𝑦) > 𝑉3
𝐹(𝑦) 
Note moreover that for 𝜃 =
1
2
 similarly to what we have seen for the investment threshold in 









2.3. Numerical simulation. 
 
In order to give a sense of the magnitude of the results obtained in Chapter 1, and to better 
understand the effect that a delay in the project can have on the value of the option to invests 
both from an individual prospective and from an industry prospective, I will first provide a 
simulation by assuming as references the following values and afterwards I will go to see how 
a variation in the parameters of 𝛽 can affects the results. Starting by assuming: 
 Initial level of the stochastic parameter 𝑌0 = 𝑦 and instantaneous monopoly profit per 
unit of 𝑌𝑡,  𝜋𝑀 are both assumed to be unitary (𝑌0 = 𝜋𝑀 = 1). 
 Sunk costs of the investment are assumed to be: 𝐼 = 100. 
 Expected growth rate of the market: 𝛼 = 0.02 . 
 Volatility: σ = 15% ;  
 Interest rate: 𝑟 = 3% . 
 Share of the investment costs financed by the investment partner (when is considered): 
𝜃 = 40%. 
The following table shows what has been obtained35: 
TABLE 1 
 
As one can observe from Table 1, the benchmark situation, that represents the integrated case 
in section 1.1. of Chapter 1, is always the best alternative both in terms of timing and value. 
Moreover, it is possible to remark that because we assumed an exogenously given share of the 
costs 0 < 𝜃 < 50% we have that, a confirmation of the analysis reported in the section above, 
it is better for the potential investor to take the role of time deciding agent in the relation with 
the investment partner, consequently on the fact that in this case the project is anticipated and 
so the value of his option is higher. Note now that the introduction of one more agents with 
                                                                




respect to the benchmark case leads to a significant delay of the investment: in the case in which 
the production of the input is entrusted to an external supplier (outsourcing case in the table) 
the threshold for the investment is more than fourfold, while, depending on the framework, it 
is more than doubled or tripled in the cases where there is the introduction of an investment 
partner. However, the worse effect from a timing prospective is obtained when the interaction 
of all three agents is required in order to undertake the project: the investment threshold is about 
ten time higher in the case in which the investment partner takes the role of time deciding agent 
in the relation with the potential investor and even higher if the roles between the two are 
reversed.  
Regarding the value of the option to invest, the same considerations made in the previous 
section holds. More precisely, as we can see from the table, taking as reference the agent A, the 
effect of the introduction of an outside supplier leads to a reduction of more 30% of the value 
with respect to the benchmark case, while if we add instead the presence of an investment 
partner, considering A as time deciding agent (A as follower) we have a reduction in the value 
of more than 85%, while by considering C as time deciding agent (A as leader) the reduction 
of value is around 20% with respect to the benchmark case. Note moreover that if keep as 
reference the same framework between the potential investor and the investment partner, we 
have that in both cases the additional presence of a supplier leads to the same percentage 
reduction in the value of the option of A36, that with the above values is roughly 35%. 
Finally, for what concerns the value of the industry, as we have seen analytically, generally an 
increase in the number of the agents involved leads to a decrease in the value of the option to 
invest. However here the effects are less dramatic, in fact the industry value is the sum of the 
option to invest for the different agents involved and we can see as, in the cases where A has 
an important reduction of value, this reduction is partially compensated by the presence of one 
or more agents.  
Now, keeping as reference the results in Table 1, I will provide an analysis of how the 
investment threshold and the value of the option to invest for the potential investors can change 
if, ceteris paribus, some parameters vary. 
 
2.3.1 Effects of a change in the drift. 
 
                                                                



















By starting from a variation in the drift 𝛼, that can be thought as a parameter indicating the 
expected growth in the market37, the following two figures show respectively the variation in 
the investment threshold (Figure 1) and in the value of the option to invest for the potential 
investor (Figure 2) for 𝛼 in the interval [0.015 , 0.025]. 
FIGURE 1 – Effect of a change in 𝛼 on the investment threshold 
  
From the above figure we can observe as generally an increase in the drift 𝛼 leads to an increase 
in the investment threshold and to a delay in the project in almost all the cases examined. 
Interesting in fact is the integrated case (represented by the red line), for which an increasing in 
𝛼 has the effect to slightly anticipate the realization of the investment. The reason has to do 
with the interaction of two different forces. By recalling the (3) in Section 1.1 of chapter 1, we 







Where the right hands side represents the profits of A and the left hands side represents the 




 that so would lead to higher costs and a delay in the project, while on the other hand 
                                                                




it imply also an higher present value of the profit flows  
𝜋𝑀
𝑟−𝛼
 that favors the anticipation of the 
investment. As it is possible to observe by the simulation, the second effect seems to prevail. 
Note moreover that these two forces are present in all the threshold examined, but more agents 
are introduced and more the effect generating though 𝛽 seem to be strong. As consequence of 
this, increasing 𝛼 and the numbers of player involved leads to an exponential increasing in the 
investment threshold and so to a longer waiting period for the project’s realization. 
Now, the following figure analyze the effect that 𝛼 has on the value of the option to invest for 
the potential investor (A).  
FIGURE 2 – Effect of a change in 𝛼 on the value of the option to invest for A. 
  
From the above figure at first it is evident that the ranking of the option to invest is the same to 
the one reported in section 2.2 of this chapter, one established this, we can see as, overall, an 
increasing in 𝛼 leads, through its effect on the investment threshold, to a higher value of the 
option to invest. This result however is different in its intensity, in fact we can see as in the 
cases in which the potential investor takes the role of time deciding agents in the relation with 
the investment partner the effect of a variation in the parameter 𝛼 in the interval considered 
does not affect so much the value of the option to invest, while in the other cases we have an 
important increase in value as the expected market growth rate increases. This because in the 
cases in which is the potential investor set the timing of the investment (two blue lines in the 




because C anticipate that the project will be delayed it set an higher compensation share that so 
reduces drastically the remain profit for the potential investor. Note however that this last effect 
is counterbalanced by the fact that, generally, an increase in the investment threshold makes the 
value of the option to be more valuable. Moreover, in the opposite scenario, where the 
investment timing is set by the investment partner (two  green lines in the graph), the value of 
the compensation share is derived by A, that in the same way, because anticipates that the 
investment will be delayed, sets a compensation share that is lower as 𝛼, (and so the waiting 
period), increases so that to retain an higher share of the profits.   
 
2.3.2 Effects of a change in the volatility. 
 
Now, I will analyze the variation that a change in volatility can have on both the investment 
threshold (Figure 3) and on the value of the option to invest (Figure 4), by assuming 𝜎 takes 
the interval of values [0.15, 0.4].  
Starting with the analysis of the timing of the investment the following figure represent the 
different levels of the optimal investment threshold if, ceteris paribus, we have a variation of 
the volatility parameter (𝜎). 





From the figure above we can see that, overall, an increasing in the level of volatility leads to 
an increase in the investment threshold and so to a delay in the project. This is intuitively right 
and in line with the classic real option literature, given that more uncertainty related with the 
investment makes the investor to be more prudent and to wait more. Note that unlike the 
previous case (where we examined the variation in the parameter 𝛼), here also the timing in the 
integrated case (red line) positively vary with 𝜎, this has to do with the fact that there is no more 
the presence of two different forces, but the variation in the threshold is due only from the effect 
that 𝜎 has on the function of parameters 𝛽. Note also that even in this case it is possible to 
appreciate as more agents are involved, more sensitive the investment threshold is to an increase 
in the volatility, moreover note that, in accordance to what already seen in section 2.1 of this 
chapter, from a timing prospective it is always preferable for the potential investor to interact 
with an outside supplier instead of with an investment partner, for every level of volatility 
considered. 
Keeping in mind the above discussion about the timing, the following figure analyze the effect 
that, ceteris paribus, a changing in the volatility parameter (𝜎) has on the value of the option to 
invest for the potential investor (A).  
FIGURE 4 – Effect of a change in 𝜎 on the value of the option to invest for A 
 
As we can see from the above figure an increasing in the volatility leads to an increase of the 




the production of the input (yellow line), this is coherent with the fact that for a longer waiting 
period there is an increase in value of the option to wait for undertake an investment 
characterized by irreversibility and uncertainty. Now, given this, interesting are the cases where 
the participation of an investment partner is taken into accounts. Here we can easily see that 
there is a huge difference in value between the frameworks analyzed in Section 1.3.1 and 1.4.1 
of Chapter 1 (where the potential investor took the role of time deciding agent), represented by 
the blue lines, and the frameworks analyzed in Section 1.3.2 and 1.4.2 of Chapter 1 (where the 
potential investor sets the compensation share to offer at the investment partner), represented 
by the green lines. Not only, but also the effects of the volatility changes if we compare the two 
frameworks, in fact we have that an increasing in 𝜎 will lead to an higher value of the option to 
invest for the potential investor if the investment partner takes the role of time deciding agent, 
while it will lead to a lower value if it is the potential investor to set the timing. These 
differences are due to two opposite forces: on one hand, the effect of higher uncertainty leads 
to a delay of the project that makes the option more valuable, on the other hands, in the cases 
in which the investment partner sets its compensation, an higher level of volatility calls for a 
higher compensation share demanded by C, that so reduces the value of the option for the 
potential investor, while in the opposite cases where the investment partner takes the role of 
time deciding agent, a higher level of volatility implies a lower compensation share offered by 
the potential investor, that so have the effect to boost the value of his option. To sum up, in the 
cases in which A is the time deciding agent (blue lines) we observe that there is a decreasing in 
its option to invest, and this is due to the fact that C sets a compensation for participating in a 
given share of the costs that is so high that reduce the increment in value that normally the 
potential investor would have given the longer waiting period caused by an increase in the 
volatility.  
 
2.3.3 Effects of a change in the discount rate. 
 
Finally, I will now provide an analysis about the effect that a variation in the level of the interest 
rate 𝑟 can have on both the investment threshold (Figure 5) and on the value of the option to 
invest (Figure 6), by assuming, ceteris paribus, that 𝑟 takes values in the interval [0.03, 0.05].  





From the figure above it is possible to observe as the effect of a change in the interest rate on 
the optimal investment threshold is not the same across all the cases examined. Starting with 
the benchmark case (red line) we can see that, overall, an increase in 𝑟  leads to a higher 
investment threshold, however this is the result of two opposite forces: on one hand, for a higher 
interest rate we have that the present becomes more valuable with respect to the future so that 
the potential investor would anticipate the investment by setting a lower threshold, while on the 
other hands, the present value of the future profit flows generating by the project is indirectly 
affected by the interest rate and this makes the potential investor willing to postpone the 
investment. As one can observe from the figure above the latter force prevails in the benchmark 
case.  Note however that these two forces are acting in all the cases studied, but by increasing 
the number of agents involved we have that the second effect loses power. Specifically, if we 
first consider the two agent cases in which there is the presence of an investment partner (blue 
and green solid lines) we can see as the effect of an increase in the interest rate it is almost null. 
This because in these cases the investment threshold is also affected by the compensation share 
that the potential investor has to pay to the investment partner, so on one hand, if this share is 
set by the A (so that C is the time deciding agent), given its impatient, it will be willing to offer 




period38, on the other hands, if the compensation share is set by C (so that A is the time deciding 
agent), he will anticipate the intentions of A to postpone the investment (as in the integrated 
case), and because of this he will set a lower compensation offer in the attempt to reduce the 
investment threshold39. Now, keeping in mind these effects we have that by adding the presence 
of an outside supplier, the investment threshold is importantly reduced as the interest rate 
increase, this effect is clear if we look at the three agent cases (dashed lines). The reason behind 
this is that, while for both the potential investor and the investment partner the investment 
generate a profit flow that must be discounted, for the supplier the profits are represented by a 
lump sum payment equal to the price for the furniture of the input. So, the effect of the interest 
rate on the option to invest for the supplier goes only though the level of the investment 
threshold, and this makes B very impatient as 𝑟 increases so that it’s willing to lower the price 
of the input in order anticipate the investment. 
Finally, keeping in mind the above considerations on the investment timing, I will now provide 
a brief discussion about the effect that a change in the interest rate (𝑟) has on the value of the 
option to invest for the potential investor (A).  
FIGURE 6 – Effect of a change in 𝑟 on the value of the option to invest for A 
                                                                
38 Recall that, in the cases examined in sections 1.3.2 and 1.4.2 of Chapter 1, the optimal compensation share 




 , that, though the effect on 𝛽 it is increasing in 𝑟, while the optimal investment threshold 
was decreasing in the compensation offer.  
39 Recall that, in the cases examined in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1 of Chapter 1, the optimal compensation share 




, that, though the effect on 𝛽 it is decreasing in 𝑟, while the optimal investment 





As we can easily observe for the figure above, an increase in the interest rate leads to a generally 
lower value in the option to invest for the potential investor. The reason of this is twofold: on 
one hand there is the effect on the investment timing examined before, and overall from the 
standard real option literature we know that generally a lower waiting period makes the value 
of the option to be less valuable. On the other hands there is the effect of the interest rate on the 
discount factor of the profit flows generating by the project, in fact, a higher 𝑟, ceteris paribus, 
has the effect to increase the discount factor and this it leads to a lower present value of the 












Chapter 3: Allowing for competition between agents. 
 
In this Chapter of my thesis I will enlarge the framework seen in Chapter 1. Specifically, by 
following the general idea that the potential investor (A) willing to undertake the project is 
thought as a start-up and so do not have the financial resources needed, I will always consider 
the presence of an investment partner (C) providing part of the funds needed to finance the 
investment. Given this, in the following sections I will analyze first the case in which there is 
the presence of two upstream firms that can compete or coordinate each other to provide the 
input needed to the project. Second I will analyze the case in which the outside supplier is only 
one, but there are two start-up firms willing to undertake the same project that need to obtain 
the input and so again they can go under a cooperative setting or can compete against each 
other. In order to simplify the analysis, I will take as reference the framework seen in Section 
1.4.1, so by always considering as time deciding agent the potential investor. Anyway, this do 
not affect the major results given that, as previously shown in section 1.4 of Chapter 1, the price 
for the acquisition of the input from an outside supplier it is independent by the type of 
interaction that the investment partner has with the potential investor.  
  
3.1. Competition between suppliers. 
 
In this first subsection I will examine the case in which there is the presence of two outside 
suppliers that need the furniture of the discrete input and one potential investor willing to 
undertake the project under the condition of receiving part of the funds needed by an investment 
partner. So, while the relationship with the external investor is similar to the one seen in section 
1.4.1, here the difference will lies on the determination of the input price that will be the result 
of the interaction between the two outside suppliers (called S1 and S2). In the following 
subsections two situations are examined: first the two upstream firms are assumed to engage in 
a Bertrand competition over price and second the suppliers decide to collude. In order to 
proceed some assumption are needed: 
 Two upstream firm will have constant and equal production costs: I. 
 They are both able to deliver the same homogeneous discrete input (so that the 
downstream firm will buy from who makes the lowest price). 
 S1 and S2 will set their prices simultaneously (I assume that once they make the price 
offer for the production of the input, the potential investor has to choose and sign the 




 If the same price is set, the potential investor will choose randomly the supplier of the 
input. 
 
3.1.1 Bertrand competition case. 
 
Given the above assumptions, in this sub-section I will consider the case in which the two 
suppliers will engage in a Bertrand competition over price, so each firm will have an incentive 
to offer for the furniture of the input a price lower than the other. Given this, the interaction 
between B1 and B2 it is reduced to a simple game in which the unique Nash Equilibrium is 
represented by the fact that both suppliers will set a price near to their marginal costs 
(represented by I) such that:  
 𝑝𝑆1 = 𝑝𝑆2 = 𝑝𝑆 = 𝜔𝐼   (51) 
Where 𝜔 is a constant greater than, but near to one, such that 𝜔𝐼 represents the minimum price 
with which the suppliers realize some profit, so that they will have an incentive to provide the 
discrete input. Note that each upstream firm would always like to undercut the other because 
doing so it will be able to capture the entire market and to become the only monopolistic 
supplier. Following this we will have that the profits, and so the value of the option to invest 
for the two suppliers will be positive although near to zero and so that the potential investor 
will be able to buy the discrete input at a price similar to the one that he could have by produce 
it by himself.  Given this background, the four players are assumed to follow these steps: 
I. The two suppliers engage in a competition over price that will end up in fixing the same 
input price:  𝑝𝑆1 = 𝑝𝑆2 = 𝑝𝑆 = 𝜔𝐼 . 
II. The investment partner (C) decides optimally the compensation share (𝛾4) that is willing 
to take in order to participate in an exogenously given share (𝜃) of the investment costs.  
III. Given the price and the compensation chosen in the previous steps, the potential investor 
(A) determines the timing.  
Proceeding backwards, following the same procedure of section 1.4.1, the optimal investment 





 𝑉𝐴4(𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦4(𝛾4,𝑝𝑆) ((1 − 𝛾4)
𝑦4(𝛾4, 𝑝𝑆)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼






From which we retrieve: 







Note that, as previously seen, the decision about the compensation share made by C is 
independent from the price at which the discrete input is bought, and so we have that, similarly 
to section 1.4.1: 
  𝛾4 = 𝛾3
𝐹 =
1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
 (54) 
Now, proceeding backward, the suppliers engage in a Bertrand competition over price that ends 
up in fixing the same price40, such that no one has the incentive to deviate (to change his own 
price) and: 
 𝑝𝑆1 = 𝑝𝑆2 = 𝑝𝑆 = 𝜔𝐼 (55) 
Given the above expression, on one hand, if a firm try to gain by increase its price it will sell 
nothing, and its profits will be zero because A will buy the input by the one that fix the lower 
price. On the other hands if a firm try to gain by decrease its price, it will capture the market 
entirely, but it will sell at a loss or without making profits. From these considerations, it is clear 
that the above price represents the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Now, substituting the 
(54) and (55) into the (53) we have: 
  𝑦4(𝛾4, 𝑝𝑆) = (
𝛽 − 𝜃
𝛽 − 1
) 𝜔𝑦∗ (56) 
The above expression represents the optimal investment threshold from the potential investor 
prospective. Note that in this case the project will be delayed with respect to the integrated case 




𝑦4(𝛾4, 𝑝𝑆) > 𝑦
∗.  
 
                                                                




Now, by substituting the (56) into the equations for the value of the option to invest of the 
different agents, we can retrieve41: 







 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) (57) 
 
𝑉𝐴4(𝑦) = 𝜔














Note that the (57) represent the expected value of the option to invest for both suppliers, in fact 
following the assumptions, we will have that in the case in which the suppliers sets the same 
price for producing the input the potential investor will choose randomly between the two, so 









 𝑉𝐼(𝑦)] + 
1
2
[0] = 𝑉𝑆2 = 𝑉𝑆1 (60) 
Note moreover that in the case in which the suppliers are willing to gain zero profits in order to 
win the competition (𝜔=1) the minimum price that they are willing to accept become exactly 
equal to their marginal costs (represented by I) and the value of their option to invest goes to 
zero. In this scenario we will have that the presence of an outside firm providing the discrete 
input would have the same effect of the case in which the potential investor produce the input 
by itself, and so both the level of the optimal investment threshold and value of the option to 
invest for A and C would be equal to the case examined in section 1.3.1. of Chapter 1. 
 
3.1.2 Collusion case. 
 
In this subsection I will examine the case in which the two upstream firms will decide to collude 
instead of to compete over price. Recalling the previous assumptions, the four players are 
assumed to follow these steps:  




                                                                
41 See Appendix 3.1.1 to the calculation. 




II. The investment partner (C) decides optimally the compensation that he is willing to take 
in order to participate in the investment.  
III. Given the price and the compensation chosen in the previous steps, the potential investor 
(A) determine the optimal investment threshold. 
Note that the procedure is similar to the one analyzed in the previous section, with the only 
difference that now the price of the input is set by the collusion of the two upstream suppliers. 
So, by proceeding backwards, the optimal time for the investment is given by the following 
expression: 











That is equivalent to the threshold in section 3.1.1. and to the one retrieved in section 1.4.1, so 





1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
 (62) 
Note that, as before, the compensation share asked by the investment partner is independent 
from the price that will be set by the interaction of the two upstream firms, so also in this case 
it will be determined in the same way of section 1.4.1. Now, regarding the choice of the two 
suppliers, in case of collusion, the price set will be equal to the monopoly price43, that in our 
case coincides with the price that maximize the following value function:  
  𝑉𝑆𝐶1(𝑦) = 𝑉𝑆𝐶2(𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑆
𝐶(𝑝𝑆









Note that the above maximization problem is the same of the one analyzed in sections 1.2 and 
1.4, where there was the presence of only one supplier, in fact in choosing the price to set S1 
and S2 will behave as if they were the only firm able to produce the input. So, the monopolistic 








                                                                
43See Osborne, M.J. (2009). 




Now, by substituting the (62) and the (64) into the (61), the expression of the optimal 








That it is equivalent to the one retrieved in Section 1.4.1. So, given the above analysis, we have 
that in case of collusion the values of the options to invest for both the potential investor and 
the investment partner are the same to the one derived in Section 1.4.1, and given that, we can 
write:  
𝑉𝐴4























While for what regard the value of the options of the two suppliers, we have that: 
 𝑉𝑆1















So, given that the two firms collude, they set the same monopoly price for the furniture of the 
input and the value of their option to invest will be equal to half the value that the supplier gets 
in the case examined in section 1.4.1 where there is only one to provide the input. Indeed, 
recalling the general assumption made at the beginning of section 3.1, the potential investor 
will choose randomly who to rely on the production of the input, so that the (68) represents the 



















𝐶 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝑆2
𝐶 (𝑦) (69) 
Note that we would have had the same result also assuming that in case of equal price the 
investor decides to split the furniture, again the case it would have been the same as in section 
1.4.1 with the difference that the two suppliers would have shared the market equally and so 
the value of their option to invest would have been halved.  
Most important to note is the fact that this is not a Nash equilibrium, in fact both suppliers have 
an incentive to deviate and undercut each other. This last observation is crucial if we analyze 




equivalent to the prisoner’s dilemma 45 , as it is possible to observe from the following 
representation: 
S1\S2 COMPETE COLLUDE 
COMPETE 𝑉𝑆1(𝑦) ; 𝑉𝑆2(𝑦) 𝑉𝑆1
𝑀(𝑦) ; 0 
COLLUDE 0 ;  𝑉𝑆2
𝑀(𝑦) 𝑉𝑆1





𝑀(𝑦)  represent the values of the options to invest if, respectively, S1 
decides to deviate from collusion while S2 collude and vice versa. In this case we have that the 
supplier that decides to deviate will offer a price just lower the monopolistic one that the two 
had decided to propose in collusion so that to be able to capture the entire market and to receive 
a value near to the monopolistic one. So, by offering a price 𝑝𝑆′
𝐶 = 𝑝𝑆
𝐶(2 − 𝜔) 46 the supplier 




𝛽(1 − 𝜔) + 1
(2 − 𝜔)𝛽
𝑉𝐵3




  represent the loss of value in the option to invest given by the fact that the 
supplier that compete, in order to win the entire market (or to be sure to be chosen by the 
potential investor) has to fix a price just lower than the monopolistic one, so that the value of 
his option to invest will be just lower than the value under the monopoly situation examined in 
section 1.4.1 of  chapter 1, where the unique producer of the input where able to gain entirely 
the value 𝑉𝐵3
𝐹 (𝑦).  
Now, given that each upstream firm is rational and has an incentive to reduce its price slightly 
below the other firm’s price, as we can see in the game representation above, the two agents 
will end up playing the only Nash equilibrium: (COMPETE, COMPETE) nevertheless there is 
an alternative (COLLUDE, COLLUDE) that is Pareto-superior but not sustainable.47  
 
 
                                                                
45  See Dixit A.K, Skeath S, and Reiley D.H. (2009). 
46 Note that because 𝜔 is greater than, but close to one, so (2 − 𝜔) will be lower than but close to one. 
47 Note in fact that: (𝑉𝑆1
𝑀(𝑦) = 𝑉𝑆2
𝑀(𝑦)) > (𝑉𝑆1
𝐶 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝑆2





3.2. Competition between potential investors. 
 
In this subsection I will come back on the case exposed in section 1.4.1 of chapter 1, where I 
considered only one supplier providing the discrete input and one outside investor helping in 
financing the investment. Now, as previously anticipated at the beginning of this chapter, I will 
assume that there are two potential investors (called here D1 and D2) with similar ideas that are 
willing to undertake the same project. So, while the relationship with the external investor (C) 
is analogue to what we have seen in section 1.4.1, here we will have a difference input price, 
that will be the result of the interaction between the two start-up firms with the outside supplier 
(B). 
In the following subsections two cases are examined: first the firms engage in a Bertrand 
competition and second the two try to collude. In order to do this some assumption are needed 
in order to simplify the problem: 
 The two potential investors will offer a price simultaneously. I assume that once they 
make the price offers for the acquisition of the input, the supplier must choose and sign 
the contract for the future furniture, so that the price will remain the same. 
 The two start-up firms are assumed to have similar infrastructure, so that they can gain 
the same profit stream from realization of the project. 
 The investor that will place the highest bid will be chosen, if the same price is set, the 
supplier will choose randomly the client for the input. 
 The outside investment partner (C) is assumed to be willing to finance only the investor 
that obtains the exclusive furniture from the supplier.   
 
3.2.1 Bertrand competition case. 
 
Given the above assumptions, in this sub-section I will consider the case in which the two 
downstream firms (D1 and D2) engage in a Bertrand competition over price, so that each one 
has an incentive to offer the highest possible price for the acquisition of the input. Note that, by 
doing so, intuitively we can expect that the net present value of the two potential investors will 
be brought to zero, while the value for the supplier will be increased with respect to the case 
without competition examined in section 1.4.1 of Chapter 1. 




I. The two potential investors (D1 and D2) mutually discover they have a competitor for 
the acquisition of the input, so that they engage in a competition over price, and the 
upstream supplier (B) will choses to who provide the furniture. 
II. The investment partner (C) decides optimally the compensation share (𝛾4) that is willing 
to take in order to participate in an exogenously given share (𝜃) of the investment costs.  
III. The two potential investors determine the optimal investment threshold at which they 
would like to undertake the investment.  
So, by proceeding backward, starting with the problem of D1 and D2, the optimal investment 
threshold at which the two would like to undertake the investment is given by the solution of 
the following maximization problem: 
  𝑉𝐷1(𝑦) = 𝑉𝐷2(𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦5(𝛾5,𝑝𝐷) ((1 − 𝛾5)
𝑦5(𝛾5, 𝑝𝐷)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼






Note that the above expression is equivalent to the one examined in section 1.4.1 of Chapter 1, 
so that we obtain: 






Given this, by proceeding backwards, the investment partner will set the compensation offer by 
solving the following problem: 









From which it yields: 
 𝛾5 =
1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
 (74) 
In fact, similarly to the situation in section 1.4.1 of Chapter 1, we have that the investment 
partner do not care about the presence of a supplier, and so requires a compensation that it is 
independent from the cost of the input. In fact, 𝛾5 will only depends directly on the amount of 
the exogenously given share of the costs (𝜃) and indirectly from the parameters contained in 
the function 𝛽.  
Now, proceeding backwards the D1 and D2 engage in a Bertrand competition over prices, that 




potential investors will be brought to zero, so the maximum price set by the two competitors 
will be the one that makes the following equation equal to zero: 
  𝑉𝐷1(𝑦) = 𝑉𝐷2(𝑦) = ((1 − 𝛾5)
𝑦5(𝛾5, 𝑝𝐷)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼
− (1 − 𝜃)𝑝𝐷) = 0 (75) 
From which: 






(2 − 𝜔) (76) 
Where 𝜔 is a constant greater than but near to one, so that the price in the above expression 
reduces the net present value to the minimal value for which the two potential investors are 
willing to undertake the project. Note in fact that, for higher prices, the value of the two potential 
investors undertaking the project will be completely null or negative, so that they do not have 
an incentive to make the investment. While, on the other hand, if one of the two offers a lower 
price, then it will be sure that it will lose the opportunity to obtain the furniture of the input 
from the supplier, that it will choose the other potential investor that offered a slightly higher 
price.  
Now, by receiving the same offer, the unique supplier will pick out randomly to which player 
provide the furniture of the input needed to the project. But by doing so, given that the price 
offered depends also from the magnitude of the optimal investment threshold, we have that B 
has an incentive to wait the achievement of a given threshold before start providing the 
furniture. Specifically, B will have to solve the following problem: 






In other words, the competition between D1 and D2 makes B in the condition to dry up the 
expected profit flows deriving from the project, that otherwise (in absence of competition) 
would go to the potential investor. So, by the solution of the above expression we have: 







That is practically equal to the investment threshold at which the potential investor would 




internally the input needed for the project48. So, by substituting the (78) in the equation of the 





That it represents also the optimal price that the supplier asks for the production of the input in 
the case in which there is no competition. Now, provided this, by substituting the (74) into the 
equation (78) of the optimal investment threshold determined by the supplier, we can write: 










So, note that the supplier put in place another constraint, such that the investment in the end 
will take place at the above threshold. Given this, by substituting the (79) and the approximation 
in the (80) into the values of the options to invest for the different agents involved we have: 
  𝑉𝐷1(𝑦) = 𝑉𝐷2(𝑦) ≅ 0 (81) 














) (1 − 𝜃) (83) 
So, as result of the competition, the two potential investors will get nothing, while the supplier 
it is able to obtain its optimal price and to anticipate the investment with respect the no 
competition case examined in section 1.4.1 of chapter 1. As consequence of this, we will also 
have that the value of the option to invest for both the supplier and the investment partner will 
be higher than in the three-agent case in section 1.4.1 of chapter 1. 
 
3.2.2. Collusion case. 
 
                                                                
48 Note in fact that being 𝜔 a constant greater than but near to one, the terms  1
(2−𝜔)
 will be so close to one that 




In this subsection I will examine the case in which the two downstream firms D1 and D2 decide 
to collude instead of competing each other over price. I will assume, as in section 3.1.1 that the 
supplier is willing to grant the furniture only in the case of positive profits, so that the minimum 
price that he is willing to accept is just greater than his costs I. Given this the downstream firms, 
that have an incentive to offer the lower price possible to boost their value, will coordinate to 




𝐶 = 𝜔𝐼 (84) 
Where 𝜔 is a constant greater than, but near to one, such that 𝜔𝐼 represents the minimum price 
with which the supplier makes some profit and so has an incentive to provide the discrete input.  
Now, recalling the previous assumptions, the four players are assumed to follow these steps: 





II. The investment partner (C) decides optimally the compensation share that he is willing 
to take in order to participate in an exogenously given share (𝜃) of the costs of the 
investment. 
III. Given the price and the compensation chosen in the previous phases, the two potential 
investors determine the optimal investment threshold. 
With this premises, by proceeding backwards, we will have that, the optimal investment 
threshold is given by the following maximization problem:  
 𝑉𝐷1
𝐶 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐷2
































Now, recalling that the decision made by C regarding the optimal compensation share (𝛾5
𝐶) it is 
independent from the price at which the potential investor buy the input from the suppliers and 
by noting that the above expression of the optimal investment threshold it is similar to the one 
                                                                




already examined in section 1.4.1 of Chapter 1, we have that the compensation share is given 





1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
 (87) 
Now, as previously anticipated, the two potential investors deciding to collude set the minimum 




𝐶 = 𝜔𝐼 (88) 
Note however that this does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, in fact each potential investor 
has always the incentive to offer a higher price in order to be sure to obtain the furniture of the 
input. Now, by substituting the (87) and the (88) into the equation for the optimal investment 




𝐶 ) = (
𝛽 − 𝜃
𝛽 − 1
) 𝜔𝑦∗ (89) 
Note that the above investment threshold it is similar to the one obtained in section 1.3.1 of 
Chapter 1, where the supplier was not taken into consideration. This because by colluding the 
two potential investors set a price for acquiring the input near to the investment costs that they 
would pay if they were able to produce it, so given this, the values of the option to invest for 
the supplier and the investment partner are respectively equal to: 
 𝑉𝐵5
𝐶 (𝑦) = (𝑝𝐷















 𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (90) 
 
𝑉𝐶5


























𝑉𝐼(𝑦)  (91) 
Note that that if 𝜔 = 1, so the price offered by the two potential investors in collusion it is 
perfectly equal to the pure costs I, and in this case we would have that the value of the option 
to invest for the supplier (B) goes to zero, while the value for the investment partner (C) will 
be exactly the same of the one retrieved in section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1.  
Now, the value of the option to invest for the two potential investors will be given by:  
𝑉𝐷1













So, given that the two potential investors collude, they agree to set the same price for acquire 
the furniture of the input from the supplier, that so it will choose randomly to who provide the 
input. For this reason, the above expression represents the expected value of the option to invest 














𝐶 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐷2
𝐶 (𝑦) (93) 
Note that we would have had the same result also assuming that in case of equal price the unique 
supplier decides to split the furniture, so the two potential investor would have shared the 
market equally and so the value of their option to invest would have been halved.  
Finally, it is important to highlight that this is not a Nash equilibrium, in fact each potential 
investor has an incentive to deviate and offer a price just higher than the other competitor, this 
because by doing so they will have the certainty to be chosen by the supplier and so to become 
monopolists. In fact, similarly to the situation presented in Section 3.1.2 of this chapter, we will 
have that this situation is equivalent to the prisoner’s dilemma50, as illustrated in the following 
representation: 
D1\D2 COMPETE COLLUDE 
COMPETE 𝑉𝐷1(𝑦) ; 𝑉𝐷2(𝑦) 𝑉𝐷1
𝑀 (𝑦) ; 0 
COLLUDE 0 ; 𝑉𝐷2
𝑀 (𝑦) 𝑉𝐷1




𝑀 (𝑦) and 𝑉𝐷2
𝑀 (𝑦)  represent respectively the values of the options to invest if D1 
decides to deviate from collusion while D2 collude and vice versa. In this case we have that 
one potential investor deviate and offer a price just higher the minimum agreed with the 
competitor, so that to obtain the exclusive furniture and so to receive a value closer to the one 
that it would have had if it had been able to produce the input internally51. So, by offering a 
price 𝑝𝐷′
𝐶 = 𝑝𝐷
𝐶𝜔 = 𝐼𝜔2 the player that deviates will get a value: 
  𝑉𝐷1
𝑀 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐷2
𝑀 (𝑦) = 𝜔2(1−𝛽)𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) (94) 
                                                                
50  See Dixit A.K, Skeath S, and Reiley D.H. (2009). 




Where, recalling that 𝜔 is a constant greater than, but close to one, and 𝛽 > 1, we will have 
that the terms 𝜔2(1−𝛽) is lower than, but close to one. Now, given that each potential investor 
is assumed to be rational, both D1 and D2 will have an incentive to slightly increase the price 
with respect to the one set by the competitor, so that, similarly to what we have seen in section 
3.1.2 of this section, the two agents will end up playing the only Nash equilibrium: (COMPETE, 
COMPETE) given that the alternative (COLLUDE, COLLUDE), as shown, it is not 
sustainable. 
 
3.3. Discussion of results. 
 
In this chapter I have expanded the situation presented in the section 1.4.1 of chapter 1, where 
the three agents were assumed to interact without the presence of competitors. First, I have 
considered, in section 3.1, the situation in which the presence of another upstream firm is added 
to the framework, so that the two suppliers are first assumed to compete over prices (Bertrand 
competition) and then to collude. Second, in section 3.2, I have analyzed the case in which the 
outside supplier is only one, but there are two potential investors willing to undertake the project 
that, in order to obtain the furniture of the input needed can again decide to cooperate or to 
compete over prices. From the analysis is evinced that in both cases the situation in which the 
two competitors decide to collude is the more profitable, but, given that this does not constitute 
a Nash equilibrium the two players will inevitably end up competing.  
Specifically, in the framework of section 3.1, the two upstream suppliers will engage in a 
Bertrand competition that will lead basically to the same situation of section 1.3.1 of chapter 1 
in which was assumed that the potential investor was able to produce internally the input needed 
to undertake the project. In fact, the competition will lead the two suppliers to lower the price 
at a level such that the values of their option to participate in the project will be reduced 
approximately to zero, while the optimal investment threshold and the values of the option to 
invest for the potential investor and the investment partner will be roughly the same to the one 
retrieved in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1. 
While, more interesting is the situation examined in section 3.2. of this chapter. Also in this 
case the two competitors will end up engaging in a Bertrand competition over prices that will 
reduce the values of the option to invest for the two potential investors roughly to zero, but as 
result of the fact that the price set by the two potential investor is a function of the optimal 
investment threshold here we will have that the supplier will set a threshold so that to obtain its 




section 1.4.1 of chapter 1. Specifically, the investment will be undertaken at the same threshold 
of the one retrieved in the case of section 1.3.1 of chapter 1 ( 𝑦5(𝛾5, 𝑝𝐷) = 𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹)), and, as 
result of this, the value of the option to invest for the supplier will be even higher than the one 
in the separated case examined in section 1.2 of chapter 1. While, regarding the value of the 
option to invest for the investment partner, this will be lower than the one in the external funding 
case in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1, given that, for the same investment threshold, in this situation 























Chapter 4: Introducing the policy maker in the external funding 
case. 
 
In this section I will provide an extension of the framework discussed in section 1.3 of Chapter 
1. Starting by the assumption that the potential investor’s project has a positive impact on the 
society, it is plausible to consider a government involvement. In fact, if we think the potential 
investor investing in a project as a high-tech entrepreneurial firm (usually referred in the 
literature as New Technology-Based Firms or NTBFs52) we have that, given its contribution to 
the social welfare, it represent an important policy target that the government should pursue53. 
So, in this chapter I will study the effect that the introduction of a policy maker can have on 
both the timing and the value of the investment. Note that here I will assume for simplicity that 
the potential investor is able to produce internally the input needed so that there the presence 
of an outside supplier is not taken into account54.This Chapter, is divided in three sections: in 
section 4.1 I will consider the potential investor (A) as the time deciding agents, in Section 4.2 
I will assume that the optimal time of the investment will be chosen by the private investment 
partner (C) and finally in section 4.3 I will sum up the major results obtained.  
 
4.1. Potential investor as time deciding agent. 
 
In this section I will expand the framework presented in Section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1, where the 
financial resources needed to undertake the project were provided by an external investment 
partner acting as leader in the relation with the potential investor (A). Now, given the 
assumption that the project’s realization generates annual constant social benefits (𝐺𝐵),  I will 
add the presence of the policy maker that, for high enough level of 𝐺𝐵, it will have an incentive 
to intervene in order to try to facilitate the investment. Given this, the potential investor will 
receive on one hand a subsidy (𝐺𝐶
𝐹) by the government (G) and on the other hand part of the 
financial resources needed by a private investment partner (C), that can be thought as a venture 
capitalist. Now, I will assume that the timing of the game will be the following: 
                                                                
52 Referring to the standard definition proposed by Arthur D. Little (1977) that identifies an NTBF as an 
independent firm that is less than 25 years old and is active in high-technology industries. 
53 See Audretsch, (1995) and Stam and Garnsey, (2008). 
54 I already shown in Chapter 1 the effect of the additional presence of an outside supplier and it is possible to 




I. The government (G), given a high enough level of the annual social benefit (𝐺𝐵), offers 
to finance together with the C the project. 
II. The private investment partner (C) decides optimally the compensation share (𝛾𝐺
𝐹) that 
it is willing to take to cover a given share of the costs of the investment (θ). 
III. The potential investor (A) decides if accept the offer made by C and it set the timing of 
the investment. 
Proceeding backward, I start from the problem of the potential investor that, taking into 
consideration the actions of the other two agents involved, decides the optimal investment 
threshold that trigger the investment by solving the following:  
𝑉𝐴𝐺
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  represents the percentage of total costs sustained by A in order to invest 
in the project. In fact, recall that from the pure investment costs (I) the potential investor has to 
subtract the costs 𝜃𝐼 payed by the private investment partner (C) and the amount of the subsidy 
given by the government (𝐺𝐶
𝐹) so that, in percentage, Φ represent the effective contribution that 
A has to pay. Now, as expected, an increase in Φ (so a decreasing in 𝜃 or a lower 𝐺𝐶
𝐹 ) has the 
effect to delay the investment, while a decreasing in the compensation share (𝛾𝐺
𝐹) that A has to 
pay to C  accelerate the realization of the project. 
Now, proceeding backward, the private investment partner (C), takes into accounts the 
investment threshold chosen by A and decides the optimal compensation offer (𝛾𝐺
𝐹)  by 
maximizing the value of its option to invest: 
𝑉𝐶𝐺

















Note that the value of the option to invest for C it is not directly dependent from the subsidy 
offered by the government, and so from the above expression it yields56: 
                                                                
55 See Appendix 4.1.a for calculations. 






Φ + 𝜃(𝛽 − 1)




From which it is possible to observe that, even if the share of costs (𝜃) paid by the private 
investment partner are near to zero, the compensation share required by the (C) in order to enter 
in the contract is still significantly positive and it depends from β57.  
Now, by substituting 𝛾𝐺







[𝛽Φ + θ(β − 1)] (99) 
Finally, the government sets the amount of the subsidy (𝐺𝐶
𝐹) so that to maximize the value of 




























This represent the optimal amount of subsidy that the government should offer to the start-up 
in order to maximize its revenue. Note that, in order to have an incentive to helping the potential 
investor in financing the project, the value of the annual social benefit (GB) must be sufficiently 




(r − α)I (102) 
That represent the minimum level of social benefit that trigger the government intervention. 
Given this, by substituting the (101) into the equation for the optimal investment threshold, we 
















Note that, the above equation is decreasing in (GB), this is intuitively right, in fact for a higher 
level of social benefit generating by the project, the government will be willing to offer a higher 
amount of subsidy that in turn will lower the costs of the potential investor that so will anticipate 
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the investment. Now, by substitution the (98), (101) and (103) into the values of the options to 
invest for the different subjects we get: 
𝑉𝐴𝐺

























































As we can observe the values of the options to invests are all dependent from the amount of 
social benefits generated by the project. For this, in section 4.3 of this chapter I will provide an 
analysis about how the different values may vary for different level of GB, comparing also this 
case with the one examined in section 1.3.1 of Chapter 1, in which the presence of the government 
was not taken into account.  
 
4.2. Investment partner as time deciding agent. 
 
Starting from a framework similar to the one in Section 3.1.2, I consider the case in which the 
potential investor (A) is able to produce internally the input but it does not have the financial 
resources needed to undertake the project, so that the presence of a private investment partner, 
(C) is needed. Indeed, in this section I will assume that A at time zero makes a compensation 
offer to C represented by the share 𝛾𝐺
𝐿 ∈ (0,1), while C, taking into account the proposal of A, 
has the option to accept immediately the offer and to pay straightaway an exogenously given 
share of the costs 𝜃 ∈ (0,1)  or it can wait and postpone the contribution. Now, in this 
framework, given that we assumed the investment would produce positive externalities, the 
policy maker has an incentive to intervene by providing part of the funds needed in order to 
have in return an annual social benefit (𝐺𝐵). So, the government, for a high enough level of 
(𝐺𝐵), commits himself to pay a subsidy 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 at the moments in which the investment will be 
undertaken. Given this, I will assume that the timing of the game will be the following: 
I. The government (G), given a high enough level of the annual social benefit (𝐺𝐵),  offers 
to finance together with C the project. 
II. The potential investor, taking into accounts the offer made by the policy maker, 
determines the optimal compensation share (𝛾𝐺





III. The investment partner decides if accept the compensation offer made by A and set the 
timing of the investment. 
Now, I start analyzing the problem of the private investment partner that, taking into accounts 
the choice of the other two agents, derives the optimal investment threshold by solving the 
following maximization problem: 
𝑉𝐶𝐺
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So, from the above expression, it easy to see as the optimal investment threshold it is increasing 
in the share of the investment costs (𝜃) payed by the investment partner while it is decreasing 
in the optimal compensation offer (𝛾𝐺
𝐿) determined by A. This is intuitively right, in fact, ceteris 
paribus, for higher costs is plausible that C would like to postpone the disbursement of the 
contribution and so the realization of the investment, while for an higher compensation it would 
like to anticipate the realization of the project. Now, proceeding backwards the potential 
investor, taking into accounts the subsidy offered by the Government, determine the optimal 
compensation offer (𝛾𝐺
𝐿) that maximize the value of its option to invest: 
𝑉𝐴𝐺




r −  α
𝑦𝐺
𝐿(𝛾𝐺













𝐼θ + (I − 𝐺𝐶
𝐿)(β − 1)
 (110) 
Note that the compensation share that A is willing to offer to C it depends on the subsidy that 
the potential investor receives from the government and,  more precisely, a higher 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 allows A 
to offer an higher compensation share to the private investment partner.  
Now, by substituting the (110) into the (108) we have that it is possible to write the optimal 
investment threshold as: 
𝑦𝐺
𝐿(𝛾𝐺
𝐿) = 𝑦∗ [







                                                                




From which we can observe as the timing of the investment depends both on the share of the 
costs payed by the private investment partner (𝜃) and on the subsidy offered by the government 
for the project’s realization. Specifically, a higher contribution (𝐺𝐶
𝐿) by the policy maker, leads 
to a lower investment threshold and so to an anticipation of the project, while a higher cost 
share (𝜃) imply a higher cost for the time deciding agent (C) and so a delay in the investment. 
By proceeding backward, we have that the government chooses the subsidy 𝐺𝐶
𝐿  so that to 















Recalling that GB represent the annual constant social benefit gain by the society in the case in 









𝜃 + (𝛽 − 1)
(𝛽 − 1)
] (113) 
Note that the government decides the amount of subsidy also by taking into accounts the share 
of the costs (𝜃) payed by the private investment partner, so that a higher (𝜃) leads to lower 
contribution by the policy maker61. Moreover, it is important to underline that the policy maker, 
in order to have an incentive to help the potential investor in financing the project, must have 
in return a sufficiently high value of the social benefit (GB), in particular, in order to provide a 
positive level of subsidy must be that: 
GB >
𝜃 + (𝛽 − 1)
𝛽(𝛽 − 1)
(r − α)I (114) 
That represent the minimum level of social benefit that trigger the government intervention. 
Given this, by substituting the (113) into the equation for the optimal investment threshold, we 














Note that, the above equation is decreasing in (GB), this is intuitively right, in fact for a higher 
level of social benefit generating by the project, the government will be willing to offer a higher 
amount of subsidy that in turn will lower the costs for the potential investor that so will be able 
                                                                
60 See appendix 4.2.b for calculations. 











to offer a higher compensation to the private investment partner that anticipates the investment. 
Finally, by substituting the (110), (113) and (115) into the equation for the values of the option 
to invest for the different agents involved, we have that: 
𝑉𝐴𝐺












































As one can easily observe the values of the options to invests are all function of the amount of 
social benefits generated by the project. Now, in the following section I will provide an analysis 
about how the different values may vary for different level of GB, comparing also the finding 
with the case examined in section 1.3.2 of Chapter 1, in which the presence of the government was 
not taken into account.  
 
4.3. Discussion of results. 
 
In this third section of the chapter I will provide some consideration about the results obtained 
in the two previous sections. So, I will show how both the investment threshold and the value 
of the option to invest for the potential investor change in relation to a different value of the 
social benefit (GB) generating by the project. Moreover, I will compare this analysis with the 
cases examined in section 1.3 of Chapter 1 in which the government was not taken into 
accounts, so to see the effects of the intervention of the policy maker. Note that in the following, 
to facilitate the comparison, I will consider the same data used in the numerical simulation 
provided in section 1.5 of Chapter 162.  
Starting with the optimal investment threshold, the following figure shows the effect that the 
added presence of the policy maker can have on the timing of the investment for a GB in the 
interval [0 ; 3]. 
FIGURE 7 – Effect of GB on the optimal investment threshold  
                                                                





The first thing to note about the above figure is that it shows a comparison between some of the 
values for the optimal investment thresholds calculated through the simulation in section 1.5 of 
Chapter 1 (solid lines), with the values of the optimal threshold in the two cases examined in 
this chapter (dashed lines).  Now, recalling that the government has an incentive to intervene 
only for a sufficiently high level of the social benefit (GB), from the above figure it is easy to 
see as if the policy maker do not intervene, the optimal investment thresholds are the same to 
the ones retrieved in section 1.3 of Chapter 1, while for values of GB sufficiently high, the 
government intervention is triggered and we can appreciate a rapid acceleration of the project.   
Specifically, starting with the case in which the potential investor is the time deciding agent 




(r − α)I ,  that in the figure correspond to the point in which we see the deviation of 
the blue solid line from the dashed one. Now, for higher value of GB, the policy maker is willing 
to provide a higher subsidy to the potential investor, that so will anticipate the investment up to 
a point in which it will be willing to undertake the project immediately. Note in fact that the 





= 1, so that 
the potential investor has no incentive to postpone the investment. This, happen for a value of 













Recalling that 𝑦 represent the current level of the state variable. So, also if for higher level of 
GB the government would be willing to offer a higher subsidy in order to further anticipate the 
investment, we have that the maximum level of subsidy that the government will offer will be 
for: 
𝐺𝐶










That represent the value of 𝐺𝐶
𝐹 such that the investment will be immediately undertaken. Note 
that, also if for higher level of GB  the government would like to offer an higher subsidy,  
because it is not possible to anticipate the investment in the past, the government will have no 
incentive to do so, because what he would pay above the value in the (120) will be not 
compensate by a further project’s acceleration.  Note moreover that, from the (120) it is also 
easy to see the level of 𝐺𝐶
𝐹 for which the investment will occurs at the same threshold of the 
benchmark case (𝑦∗), represented by the red dashed line in the above figure63.  
Now, a similar reasoning can be made also for the situation in which the time deciding agent is 
represented by the private investment partner (green lines). Here, the government will intervene 
for a level of the social benefit (GB) higher than 
𝜃+(𝛽−1)
𝛽(𝛽−1)
(r − α)I, represented in the figure by  
the point in which there is the the deviation of the green solid line from the dashed one. So, the 
policy maker will provide a level of subsidy 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 that is increasing in GB, and this will lead to an 
anticipation of the investment, up to the point in which the project will be immediately 






= 1, the private investment partner has no incentive to postpone the investment. Now, 
this point is reached for a value of the social benefit at least equal to: 
GB =
𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1
𝛽 − 1






Recalling also here that 𝑦 represent the current level of the state variable. Now, the maximum 
level of subsidy that the government will offer will be for: 
                                                                
63 In fact, by setting 
𝑦
𝑦∗
= 1 we will have that the amount of subsidy necessary to make the potential investor willing 
undertake the project at the benchmark level will be  𝐺𝐶












𝐿 = 𝐼 [






That represent the value of 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 such that the investment will be immediately undertaken. So, 
also here, the government will have no incentive to offer a higher subsidy, because what he 
would pay above the value in the (122) will be not compensate by a further acceleration of the 
project.  Note moreover that, from the (122) it is also easy to see the level of 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 for which the 
investment will occurs at the same threshold of the benchmark case (𝑦∗), represented by the 
red dashed line in the above figure64.  
Finally, from the Figure 7, it is possible to appreciate as the policy maker will intervene earlier 
if the potential investor takes the role of time deciding agent (blue line), while it will wait for 
higher level of the social benefit in the case in which is the investment threshold is decided by 
the private investment partner (green line). However, note that when the government will 
intervene, it will be more expensive for him to make the private investment partner willing to 
immediately undertake the project than make the potential investor be willing to anticipate the 




𝐹) is more sensitive to an increasing in the subsidy than 𝑦𝐺
𝐿(𝛾𝐺
𝐿 , 𝐺𝐶
𝐿)65, and  
given that the variation of the subsidy with respect to the amount of social benefit generated by 












this means that it will take lower financial resources to the policy maker to make the potential 
investor anticipate the investment. 
Now, going to the analysis of the value of the option to invest for the potential investor (A), the 
following figure will show the effect that the added presence of the policy maker can have for 
a GB in the interval [0 ; 3]. 
 
 
                                                                
64 In fact, by setting 
𝑦
𝑦∗
= 1 we will have that the amount of subsidy necessary to make the private investment 































FIGURE 8 – Effect of GB on the value of the option to invest for A 
 
The first thing to say about the above figure is that the two vertical purple dashed lines represent 
the levels of the social benefit that trigger the government intervention in the two cases 
examined, while the two vertical black lines are the thresholds for which the subsidy offered 
by the policy maker is so high that the investment is immediately undertaken.  
As we can observe before the policy maker intervention, the values of the option to invest for 
the potential investor are the same to those retrieved in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. Now, once the 
level of social benefit GB is sufficiently high the government is willing to provide a subsidy in 
order to anticipate the realization of the project, and as we can see from the above figure this 
has a different effect on the value of the option to invest depending on which role the potential 
investor takes in the relation with the private investment partner.   
Specifically, starting by analyzing the situation in which the potential investor (A) is the time 
deciding agent (blue lines), we have that before the government intervention the value of its 
option to invest it is equal to the one retrieved in section 1.3.1 of chapter 1. Subsequently, for 
higher level of GB  the government intervene providing a subsidy in order to anticipate the 
investment, and the value of the option to invest at first is slightly increasing but right after 
decreases up to a point in which it goes approximately to zero. This is the result of different 
forces interacting. First, a higher level of  𝐺𝐶




(that should increase the value of the option to invest) and to an anticipation of the investment 
(that has the effect to reduce the level of the optimal investment threshold and so to reduce the 
overall value of the option to invest). Second, by setting the timing the potential investor leaves 
the power to the private investment partner (C) to set its compensation share. So that C, by 
taking into account the rapid acceleration of the project derived from an increasing level of 𝐺𝐶
𝐹, 
would like to have an increasing compensation share (𝛾𝐺
𝐹) that it will reduce the value of the 
option to invest for A. As we can see from Figure 8, this second effect prevails, and the value 
of the potential investor is brought approximately to zero. About this note moreover that for: 
𝐺𝐶






)], the private investment partner would like to set a compensation share 
that  is higher than one, but provided the fact that in this scenario A will get a negative value 
(so it is likely that will not undertake the investment), C will limit his compensation share to 
the maximum he can set provided that the value of A will not be negative, (so that it will have 
an incentive to realize the project).  So, the private investment partner will set, progressively 
with the project acceleration, a higher compensation up to 𝛾𝐺
𝐹 ≅ 166 and this will lead the value 
for A to be approximately zero. In other words C, aware of the fact that A will receive a subsidy 
from the government and that this will anticipate its investment decision, wants to set a higher 
compensation share to be remunerated by the fact that it will have to provide its share of the 
investment costs earlier, and this will drain out all the profit from A.  
Analyzing now the situation in which the role of time deciding agent is taken by the private 
investment partner (green lines) we can easily see from the above figure as the things drastically 
change for the potential investor. In fact, while we have that before the government intervention 
the value of its option to invest it is equal to the one retrieved in section 1.3.2 of chapter 1, after 
the intervention of the policy maker, the value of the option to invest for A rapidly increases up 
to overcome the level of the option to invest retrieved in the benchmark case (red dashed line), 
reaching so an even higher value. The reason of this has to do with the interaction of different 
forces. First note that a higher level of  𝐺𝐶
𝐿 leads both to a reduction of the investment costs 
(that should increase the value of the option to invest) and to an anticipation of the investment 
(that has the effect to reduce the level of the optimal investment threshold and so to reduce the 
overall value of the option to invest). Second, more importantly, given that for the government 
is more expensive to anticipate the investment in this case, it will have to provide a high level 
of subsidy to make the investment partner willing to anticipate the investment, so that the 
                                                                
66 Note in fact that for a level of the compensation share exactly equal to one (𝛾𝐺
𝐹 = 1), the potential investor 




potential investor will get a level of 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 greater than the one needed to completely offset the 
costs of the investment and in this way it can provide a higher compensation share to the 
investment partner that so will be willing to accelerate the project’s realization. Note in fact 





= 1) it will 
have to provide a subsidy equal to 𝐺𝐶






] and so, the potential investor will get a 
value equal to: 
𝑉𝐴𝐺











> 1 given the assumption used though the paper, we have that in 
the above expression 𝑉𝐴𝐺
𝐿 (𝑦) > 𝑉𝐼(𝑦). Moreover, from the (123) it is also possible to check that 
in the case in which the investment it is undertaken at the benchmark level, we will have 
𝑉𝐴𝐺
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑉𝐼(𝑦), as reported in the above figure by the intersection of the dashed green line 
with the red one.  
So, given the above analysis it is obvious that, from the potential investor prospective, it is 
always better to be the game leader in the relation with the private investment partner, deciding 
so the optimal compensation share to offer to C and leave the investment partner set the optimal 
investment threshold. On the other hand, if we look the situation from a government 
prospective, the policy maker will always prefer to intervene in a situation in which the role of 
time deciding agent is taken by the potential investor, because in this scenario it will be able to 














In my thesis I have presented different cases base on the application of the standard real option 
framework that consider investment opportunities as options on real assets providing a way to 
apply option pricing methods to investment decision problems. Given the large applicability of 
the subject my focus has been on the study of vertical relationships. So, by considering the 
situation in which a risk neutral potential investor is contemplating to enter in a new high 
profitable growing market characterized by uncertainty, it will have to face two problems: first, 
it will have to obtain a discrete input needed to the project’s competition (by producing it by 
himself or by relying on the furniture provided by an upstream supplier); second, in the case  in 
which it does not have enough financial resources, it will have to interact with an investment 
partner that, in return of a share of the profits generating by the project, it will provide an 
exogenously given share of the sunk investment costs. In order to study the interaction between 
these agents, I used a stochastic dynamic programming model based on the standard real option 
approach, and I have examined different cases.  
First in chapter 1 I chose to consider as benchmark case the situation in which the potential 
investor has both the financial resources and the infrastructure needed to produce the input 
required to undertake the investment. Subsequently I have expanded the basic framework 
allowing for the introduction of different agents interacting with the potential investor in order 
to see the effect that the introduction of these can have on both the investment threshold and 
the value of the option to invest. I found that the best situation with respect to the timing of the 
investment and in relation to the value of the option to invest is obtained in the case in which 
the potential investor acts independently. While the additional presence of one more agent 
causes the postponement of the project and lower the value of the option to invest. Given this, 
I also showed that regarding the time of the investment, it is always preferable for the potential 
investor to interact with the investment partner instead of the supplier, while the worse scenario 
is represented by the simultaneous involvement in the project of the upstream supplier and the 
investment partner. Instead, different is the situation if we look at the value of the option to 
invest. In fact, here we have that the ranking depends on the type of the interaction that the 
potential investor has with the investment partner, with the worse scenario represented by the 
cases in which the potential investor takes the role of time deciding agent, leaving so to the 
investment partner the decision about the compensation share that it will receive for 
participating in an exogenously given share of the investment cost. While in the opposite case 




number of agents involved, it is always better for the potential investor to interact with the 
investment partner67.  
Second, in chapter 3, by taking as reference the three-agents case in which the potential investor 
takes the role of time deciding agent68, I have expanded the framework allowing first for the 
competition between suppliers and second allowing the presence of two potential investors. 
From the analysis is evinced that in both cases two competitors will inevitably end up 
competing over prices (Bertrand competition), and this will lead to an anticipation of the 
investment with respect the three-agents case. Specifically, I found that this happen at 
approximately the same threshold retrieved in the external funding case (where only the private 
investment partner and the potential investor are involved). Different instead is the situation 
from a value prospective. In both cases analyzed the two agents that compete over price will 
end up reducing the values of their option to participate in the project approximately to zero, 
while, the thigs change for the other two players involved. In particular, when the two upstream 
suppliers compete, they lower so much the input price that the costs of the investment are 
reduced roughly to the same level that was assumed in the case in which the potential investor 
was able to produce internally the input needed to undertake the project, so that the values of 
the option to participate in the project for the investment partner and the potential investor are 
approximately equal to the one obtained in the external funding case. On the other hand, when 
the two potential investors compete, the supplier is able both to obtain its optimal price and to 
anticipate the investment with respect to the three-agents case, so that its value of the option to 
invest is even higher than the one in the separated case69, while, as consequence of this, the 
value for the investment partner will be lower than the one retrieved in the external-funding 
case, given that, for the same investment threshold, the total investment costs will be higher.  
Finally, in Chapter 4, starting from the external funding case 70 , I further expanded the 
framework by assuming that the project, once realized, has positive impact on the society, so 
that the involvement of the policy maker is plausible in order to try to facilitate the investment. 
Here I found that the government intervention is conditioned by the generation of a minimum 
level of social benefit achieved by the project, and that this threshold is higher in the case in 
which the investment partner takes the role of time deciding agent in the relation with the 
potential investor. Now, given the achievement of the minimum level of social benefit, the 
                                                                
67 See the analysis on the value of the option to invest provided in section 2.2 of chapter 2. 
68 See the case in section 1.4.1 of chapter 1. 
69 See section 1.2 of chapter 1. 




policy maker will offer a subsidy to the potential investor that, from a timing prospective, will 
have the effect to rapidly accelerate the project’s realization in both cases examined. While, 
from a value prospective, I found that the effect of the subsidy provided by the government 
change in relation to which player takes the role of time deciding agent. Specifically, in the case 
in which the optimal investment threshold is set by investment partner, the value of the option 
to invest for the potential investor is increasing in the amount of subsidy and, for a given levels 
of social benefit, also overcome the value of the option to invest retrieved in the integrated case 
(in which the potential investor is assumed to act independently). While different is the situation 
in which the potential investor set the timing of the investment, here I fund that the value 
provided by higher subsidy offered by the government goes to the investment partner that, by 
setting its own compensation share, will end up asking for almost the totality of the profits 
generating by the investment so that the value of the option to invest for the potential investor 
will be approximately null. Concluding, it is obvious that, from the potential investor 
prospective, it is always better to be the game leader in the relation with the private investment 
partner (deciding so the optimal compensation share to offer to the investment partner), while 
from a government prospective, the policy maker will always prefer to intervene in a situation 
in which the role of time deciding agent is taken by the potential investor, because in this 












                                                                






Appendix 1.1.a – Proof of the relation: 𝑽𝑰(𝒚) = 𝒎𝒂𝒙𝒚∗ (
𝛑𝐌
𝐫− 𝛂






In order to verify that: 
 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[(𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼)𝑒
−𝑟𝑇] = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[𝑒
−𝑟𝑇](𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦∗ (
πM
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I will divide the demonstration in two parts: 
I) I will show that: 





r −  α
Yt 
By considering for simplicity that the profit flows generating upon the investment in the project 
are denoted by 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡𝜋𝑀 we have that, their present value at  𝑡 ≥ 0 can be represented by: 





Where, obviously, 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜋𝑀𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝜋𝑀𝑌𝑡 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝜋𝑀𝑌𝑡 𝑑𝑊𝑡 = 𝛼𝜀𝑡 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝜀𝑡 𝑑𝑊𝑡. 
Now, for small 𝑑𝑡 it is possible to decompose 𝐹(𝜀𝑡) as: 






















= 𝜀𝑡 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒
−𝑟𝑑𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝐹(𝜀𝑡+𝑑𝑡)] 
Now, since 𝜀𝑡+𝑑𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑑𝜀𝑡, we have the following Bellman Equation: 
𝐹(𝜀𝑡) = 𝜀𝑡 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒
−𝑟𝑑𝑡𝐸𝑡[𝐹(𝜀𝑡 + 𝑑𝜀𝑡)] 
By dropping for convenience, the time representation and recalling that by using Taylor 
expansion 𝑒−𝑟𝑑𝑡 ≅ (1 − 𝑟𝑑𝑡) we can rewrite the above expression as: 
𝐹(𝜀) = 𝜀𝑑𝑡 + (1 − 𝑟𝑑𝑡)𝐸[𝐹(𝜀 + 𝑑𝜀)] 
And expanding through the Ito Lemma we get: 
𝐹(𝜀) = 𝐹(𝜀) + [
1
2
𝜎2𝜀2𝐹𝜀𝜀(𝜀) + 𝛼𝜀𝐹𝜀(𝜀) − 𝑟𝐹(𝜀) + 𝜀] 𝑑𝑡 






𝜎2𝜀2𝐹𝜀𝜀(𝜀) + 𝛼𝜀𝐹𝜀(𝜀) − 𝑟𝐹(𝜀) + 𝜀 = 0 
That represents a second order non-homogeneous differential equation, for which the solution 
will be represented by a homogenous part and a particular solution. Starting from the 
homogenous part, we guess a solution: 𝐹(𝜀) = 𝐿𝜀𝛽 . So that the first and the second partial 
derivative w.r.t. 𝜀  will be respectively 𝐹𝜀(𝜀) = 𝐿𝛽𝜀
𝛽−1  and 𝐹𝜀𝜀(𝜀) = 𝐿𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝜀
𝛽−2 . 
Substituting in the homogenous part we get: 
1
2
𝜎2𝜀2𝐿𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝜀𝛽−2 + 𝛼𝜀𝐿𝛽𝜀𝛽−1 − 𝑟𝐿𝜀𝛽 = 0 → 𝐿𝜀𝛽 [
1
2
𝜎2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + 𝛼𝛽 − 𝑟] = 0 
So that solving for the quadratic equation: 𝑍(𝛽) =
1
2
𝜎2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + 𝛼𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 the two 























Where 𝐿1and 𝐿2are two constants. 
Now, proceeding with the particular solution, by guessing a solution of the type: 𝐹(𝜀) = 𝐾𝜀, 
the first and the second partial derivative w.r.t. 𝜀 will be respectively 𝐹𝜀(𝜀) = 𝐾 and 𝐹𝜀𝜀(𝜀) =
0 so that, by substituting into the Ito Lemma’s expansion we have: 
𝛼𝜀𝐾 − 𝑟𝐿𝜀 + 𝜀 = 0 → 𝜀[𝛼𝐾 − 𝑟𝐿 + 1] = 0 





From which the particular solution is given by: 











Now, in order to determine the value of 𝐿1and 𝐿2 we have to impose two terminal conditions: 




the value of the project should go to zero, so that 𝐿1 = 0, on the other hand if 𝜀 → ∞ the value 






and recalling the initial assumption for which 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡𝜋𝑀 we have shown: 
𝐹(𝜀𝑡) =  𝐸𝑡[∫ 𝜀𝑠𝑒











II) I will show that 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[(𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼)𝑒
−𝑟𝑇] = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹∗(𝐹






By dropping the time representation for simplicity, and by assuming that the payoff deriving 
by a project is (𝐹 − 𝐼), I will consider that F evolves accordingly to the following Geometric 
Brownian Motion:  
𝑑𝐹 = 𝛼𝐹𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐹 𝑑𝑊 
Now, considering 𝑉(𝐹) be the value of the option to invest in the project and 𝐹∗ the trigger of 
the optimal investment we can write: 
𝑉(𝐹) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[(𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼)𝑒
−𝑟𝑇] 




→ 𝑉(𝐹)𝑟𝑑𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑑𝑉(𝐹)] 
Now, by assuming 𝑟 ≤ 𝛼, and by expanding 𝑑𝑉(𝐹) by using the Ito Lemma we can rewrite the 
above problem as the following second order homogenous differential equation: 
1
2
𝜎2𝐹2𝑉𝐹𝐹(𝐹) + 𝛼𝐹𝑉𝐹(𝐹) − 𝑟𝑉(𝐹) = 0 
Where 𝑉𝐹(𝐹) and 𝑉𝐹𝐹(𝐹) represent respectively the first and the second partial derivative w.r.t. 
𝐹. Now, by guessing a solution of the form 𝑉(𝐹) = 𝐴𝐹𝛽 we have that: 𝑉𝐹(𝐹) = 𝐴𝛽𝐹
𝛽−1 and 
𝑉𝐹𝐹(𝐹) = 𝐴𝛽(𝛽 − 1)𝐹




𝜎2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + 𝛼𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 


























Where 𝐴1and 𝐴2are two constants. Now, given that 𝑉(𝐹) can go to zero but not to infinity 
(provided that it exist a point that it trigger the investment), we can get rid of the second term 
by setting 𝐴2 = 0. So, the above expression must be solved accordingly to following boundary 
conditions: 
a) 𝑉(0) = 0  
b) 𝑉(𝐹∗) = 𝐹∗ − 𝐼  
c) 𝑉′(𝐹∗) = 1  
Where the b) is called the “value-matching” condition, that states that at the moment in which 
the option is exercised its net payoff is given by (𝐹∗ − 𝐼), and the c) is the “smooth-pasting” or 
condition, and ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen to maximize the value of the option. 










Finally, by substituting these in the 𝑉(𝐹) we have: 
𝑉(𝐹) = {(𝐹





                 𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝐹 ≤ 𝐹∗             
(𝐹 − 𝐼)                    𝑓𝑜𝑟      𝐹 > 𝐹∗
 
And in conclusion we can say that:  
𝑉(𝐹) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[(𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼)𝑒
−𝑟𝑇] = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[𝑒





(𝐹∗ − 𝐼) 
 
Now, recalling from the first part that of the demonstration that: 
𝐹(𝜀𝑡) =  𝐸𝑡[∫ 𝜀𝑠𝑒













By putting the things together, we will have: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[(𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼)𝑒
−𝑟𝑇] = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇𝐸[𝑒
−𝑟𝑇](𝐹𝑇 − 𝐼) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦∗ (
πM
r −  α







Appendix 1.1.b – Sensitivity analysis of the function of parameter 𝜷. 
𝛽(𝛼, 𝜎, 𝑟) > 1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation  
1
2
𝜎2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + 𝛼𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 


















The derivatives with respect to parameters 𝛼 (expected growth of the market), 𝜎 (volatility of 

























)) ≥ 0  
Note that  𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝜎 
= 0 only if 𝜎 = 0 (no volatility case) and that 𝑟 > 𝛽𝛼.  
 
Appendix 1.1.c – Investment threshold of potential investor in the integrated 
(benchmark) case. 
Going through the maximization problem of the firm we can write 𝑉𝐼(𝑦) as: 
𝑉𝐼(𝑦) = (
𝜋𝑀
𝑟 −  𝛼




















𝑟 −  𝛼
𝑦𝛽(𝑦∗)1−𝛽 − 𝐼𝑦𝛽(𝑦∗)1−𝛽 





𝑟 −  𝛼
𝑦𝛽(1 − 𝛽)(𝑦∗)−𝛽 + 𝛽𝐼𝑦𝛽(𝑦∗)−𝛽−1 







𝑟 −  𝛼
(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝐼(𝑦∗)−1 = 0 










Remember we assumed that initially the market size is sufficiently small, so that it is convenient 
to delay the investment, we can say now more precisely that 𝑌0 < 𝑦
∗. 
 
Appendix 1.2.a. – Optimal price sets by the Supplier in the separated case. 
By going through the maximization problem of the upstream firm, substituting 𝑦1(𝑝1) into the 
equation for 𝑉𝐵1(𝑦) we can write:  





























Solving the derivative with respect to 𝑝𝑆 : 
𝑑𝑉𝐵1(𝑦)
𝑑𝑝1






(1 − 𝛽 + 𝐼𝛽𝑝1
−1) 
By setting the derivative to zero, the equation is solved for: 
(1 − 𝛽) + 𝐼𝛽𝑝1




That represents the optimal price set by the supplier of the input in the separated case.  
 
Appendix 1.2.b. – Value of the option to invest for the potential investor in the 
separated case. 
The value of the option to invest for the firm A is: 
𝑉𝐴1(𝑦) = (
𝜋𝑀
𝑟 −  𝛼






Substituting for the value of 𝑦1(𝑝1) and 𝑝1 we get: 
𝑉𝐴1(𝑦) = (
𝜋𝑀
𝑟 −  𝛼
 
























Finally substituting forward for 𝑦1(𝑝1) =
𝛽
𝛽−1








































Appendix 1.3.1.a. - Investment threshold set by the potential investor in the case 
the investment is partially externally funded.  
In order to retrieve the optimal investment threshold, the potential investor maximizes:   
𝑉𝐴2
𝐹 (𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹) ((1 − 𝛾𝐹)
𝑦𝐹(𝛾𝐹)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼










































((1 − 𝛾𝐹)(1 − 𝛽)
𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼


















Appendix 1.3.1.b. – Optimal compensation offer made by the investment partner 
in the case the investment is partially externally funded.  
The investment partner anticipating the investment timing that will be set by A, in order to 


















































(1 − 𝜃)𝛽 






𝛾𝐹 − 𝜃] (1 − 𝛾𝐹)
𝛽 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛾𝐹[𝛾𝐹(1 − 𝛾𝐹)
𝛽−1 𝛽
𝛽−1
(1 − 𝜃) − 𝜃(1 − 𝛾𝐹)
𝛽] 









(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝐹)
𝛽−1




























1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 1
 
From which we can solve for 𝛾𝐹: 
𝛾𝐹 =
1 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃𝛽
𝛽 − 𝜃
 
Appendix 1.3.2.a. - Investment threshold set by the investment partner in the case 
the investment is partially externally funded.  
In order to retrieve the optimal time to provide the financial resources to undertake the 
investment, the investment partner maximizes:   
𝑉𝐶2





































































Appendix 1.3.2.b. – Optimal compensation offer made by the potential investor in 
the case the investment is partially externally funded.  
The potential investor, anticipating the reactions of the investment partner, sets the optimal 
compensation offer in order to maximize: 
𝑉𝐴2
𝐿 (𝑦) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝛾𝐿 ((1 − 𝛾𝐿)
  𝑦𝐿(𝛾𝐿)𝜋𝑀
𝑟 − 𝛼










































































− (1 − 𝜃)𝐼𝜃−𝛽𝛾𝐿
𝛽
] 



















𝜃 − 1 + 𝜃] = 0 







𝜃 − 1 + 𝜃 = 0 → 𝛾𝐿 (
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
𝜃 + 1 − 𝜃) = 𝜃 → 𝛾𝐿 (
𝛽𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1 − 𝜃𝛽 + 𝜃
𝛽 − 1






𝜃 + 𝛽 − 1
 
 
Appendix 2 – MATLAB code used to run the simulations. 
The following code has been used to make the simulations relatively to Table 1 and to retrieve 





I=100;               %sunk costs of the investment                                                    
r=0.03;              %interest rate 
Y=1;                 %initial level of the stochastic parameter Y0 
Pie=1;               %instantaneous monopoly profit per unit of Yt 
alpha=0.02;          %expected growth rate of the market 
st=0.15;             %volatility 
theta=0.4;           %share of the investment costs financed by C  
%syms r real 
%int=[0.03 0.05]; 




                                            
%CASE 1.1: BENCHMARK/INTEGRATED CASE 
  
%optimal investment threshold 
Yop=((r-alpha)/Pie)*(beta/(beta-1))*I; 
%The value of the option to invest for A 
VI=(I/(beta-1))*((Y/Yop)^beta);  
  
%CASE 1.2: SEPARATED CASE 
  
%optimal investment threshold 
Y1=Yop*(beta/(beta-1)); 
%The value of the option to invest for A 
Va1=VI*((beta/(beta-1))^(1-beta)); 
%The value of the option to invest for B 
Vb1= VI*((beta/(beta-1))^(-beta));  
%Value of the industry 
V1=Va1+Vb1; 
  
%CASE 1.3.1: EXTERNAL FUNDING CASE - (A as time deciding agent) 
  
%The optimal investment threshold 
YF=Yop*((beta-theta)/(beta-1)); 
%The value of the option to invest for A 
VFa2=VI*(1-theta)*(((beta-1)/(beta-theta))^beta); 
%The value of the option to invest for C 
VFc2=VI*(((beta-1)/(beta-theta))^(beta-1)); 
%Value of the industry 
VF2=VFa2+VFc2; 
  





%The optimal investment threshold 
YL=Yop*((beta-1+theta)/(beta-1)); 
%The value of the option to invest for A 
VLa2=VI*(((beta-1)/(beta-1+theta))^(beta-1)); 
%The value of the option to invest for C 
VLc2=VI*(theta)*(((beta-1)/(beta-1+theta))^(beta)); 
%Value of the industry 
VL2=VLa2+VLc2; 
  
%CASE 1.4.1: THREE AGENTS CASE - (A as time deciding agent) 
  
%The optimal investment threshold is 
Y3F=Yop*(beta*(beta-theta)/((beta-1)^2)); 
%The value of the option to invest for A 
VFa3=VI*(1-theta)*(((beta-1)/(beta))^(beta-1))*(((beta-1)/(beta-
theta))^beta); 
%The value of the option to invest for B 
VFb3= VI*(((beta-1)/(beta))^beta)*(((beta-1)/(beta-theta))^beta); 
%The value of the option to invest for C 
VFc3= VI*(((beta-1)/(beta))^(beta-1))*(((beta-1)/(beta-theta))^(beta-1));  
%Value of the industry 
VF3=VFa3+VFb3+VFc3; 
  
%CASE 1.4.1: THREE AGENTS CASE - (C as time deciding agent) 
  
%The optimal investment threshold is 
Y3L=Yop*(beta*(beta-1+theta)/((beta-1)^2)); 
%The value of the option to invest for A 
VLa3=VI*(((beta-1)/(beta))^(beta-1))*(((beta-1)/(beta-1+theta))^(beta-1)); 
%The value of the option to invest for B 
VLb3=VI*(((beta-1)/(beta))^(beta))*(((beta-1)/(beta-1+theta))^(beta)); 
%The value of the option to invest for C 
VLc3=VI*(theta)*(((beta-1)/(beta))^(beta-1))*(((beta-1)/(beta-
1+theta))^beta); 
%Value of the industry 
VL3=VLa3+VLb3+VLc3; 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%_____TABLE OF THE SIMULATION_____%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
Cases={'Benchmark'; 'Outsourcing'; 'External_funding_A as time agent';... 
    'External_funding_C as time agent';'Three_agents_A as time 
agent';'Three_agents_C as time agent'}; 
Threshold=[Yop; Y1; YF; YL; Y3F; Y3L]; 
VA=[VI; Va1; VFa2; VLa2; VFa3; VLa3]; 
VB=[0; Vb1; 0; 0; VFb3; VLb3]; 
VC=[0; 0; VFc2; VLc2; VFc3; VLc3]; 
























xlabel('Interest rate (r) '); 
ylabel('Optimal investment threshold'); 
  















xlabel('Interest rate (r)'); 




Appendix 3.1.1. – Values of the option to invest for the agents involved in the case 
in which suppliers engage in a Bertrand competition over prices. 
The value of the option to invest for the two upstream suppliers is:  














































𝑉𝐴4(𝑦) = [(1 − 𝛾4)
𝜋𝑀 𝑦4(𝛾4, 𝑝𝑆)
𝑟 − 𝛼



















































































































































Appendix 4.1.a – Optimal investment threshold set by the potential investor in the 
case in which the government co-finance the project.  
Proceeding with the maximization problem of agent A in order to retrieve the optimal 
investment threshold, we solve: 
𝑉𝐴𝐺


















Taking the derivative with respect to 𝑦𝐺
𝐹(𝛾𝐺
𝐹 , 𝐺𝐶























































r −  α


































 𝛽[(1 − θ)I − 𝐺𝐶
𝐹]
=






































































Appendix 4.1.b - Optimal compensation share set by the private investment 
partner in the case in which the government co-finance the project.  
Going through the maximization problem of agent C, we have that the optimal compensation 
offer is derived from the solution of the following expression: 
𝑉𝐶𝐺




















r −  α
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does not contain 𝛾𝐺
𝐹 we can proceed by taking the derivative w.r.t. 𝛾𝐺
𝐹 of the 










IΦ1−𝛽 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝐺
𝐹)𝛽−1Φ−𝛽Iθ






𝐹)𝛽−2Φ1−𝛽 + (1 − 𝛾𝐺
𝐹)𝛽−1Φ−𝛽θ = 0






𝐹)𝛽−2 + (1 − 𝛾𝐺
𝐹)𝛽−1Φ−1θ = 0






𝐹)−1 + Φ−1θ] = 0 → 
Given that by assumption 0 < 𝛾𝐺
𝐹 < 1 and so (1 − 𝛾𝐺
𝐹)𝛽−1 > 0 we have that the solution of the 












































Φ(β − 1) + Φ + (β − 1)θ
(𝛽 − 1)Φ
) =





Φ + θ(β − 1)
Φ(β − 1) + Φ + (β − 1)θ
=
Φ + θ(β − 1)
βΦ + θ(β − 1)
 
 
Appendix 4.1.c – Value of the subsidy set by the Government in the case the 
potential investor is the time deciding agent. 
By substituting 𝛾𝐺
𝐹  into the expression for 𝑦𝐺
𝐹(𝛾𝐺
𝐹, 𝐺𝐶









Φ = 𝑦∗Φ [



























































 and that the government want to set 𝐺𝐶
𝐹  so that to 
maximize the value of its option to participate, we have that 𝐺𝐶
𝐹 is derived by the solution of 
























































































































𝐹) = β [
𝐼(1 − 𝜃) − 𝐺𝐶
𝐹
𝐼



























































Appendix 4.2.a – Optimal compensation offer set by the potential investor in the 
case in which the project is financed both by private VC and by the government. 










r −  α
𝑦𝐺
𝐿(𝛾𝐺

































































 does not contains 𝛾𝐺
𝐿 we maximize the argument inside the square 
brackets. So, by taking the derivative w.r.t  𝛾𝐺



































− I(1 − 𝜃) + 𝐺𝐶





+ I(1 − 𝜃) − 𝐺𝐶












Appendix 4.2.b – Value of the subsidy set by the Government in the case in which 
the private investment partner is the time deciding agent. 











 and that the government want to set 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 
to maximize the value of its option to participate. So, we have that 𝐺𝐶
𝐿 is derived by the solution 
















By taking the derivative w.r.t 𝐺𝐶





























































































































𝐿) − 1 = 0
→ (
β(β − 1)






𝐿) − 1 = 0




𝐿β(β − 1) = 𝐼𝜃 + (𝐼 − 𝐺𝐶
𝐿)(𝛽 − 1)               
→ 𝐺𝐶
































Appendix 4.3 – MATLAB code used to run the simulations. 
The following code is the continuation of the one that has been used to make the simulations 



























%CASE 4.1 - A as time deciding agent  
  







%optimal compensation share 
gammaGF=(phi+(theta*(beta-1)))/((phi*beta)+(theta*(beta-1))); 
gammaGFu=(phiu+(theta*(beta-1)))/((phiu*beta)+(theta*(beta-1))); 
%optimal investment threshold 
YgF=Yop*phi/(1-gammaGF); 
YgFu=Yop*phiu/(1-gammaGFu); 
%Value of the option to invest for A 
VFaG=((1-gammaGF)*(YgF*Pie/(r-alpha))-(1-theta)*I+GcF)*((Y/YgF)^beta); 
VFaGu=((1-gammaGFu)*(YgFu*Pie/(r-alpha))-(1-theta)*I+GcFu)*((Y/YgFu)^beta); 
%The value of the option to invest for C 
VFcG=((gammaGF)*(YgF*Pie/(r-alpha))-(theta*I))*((Y/YgF)^beta); 




%CASE 4.1 - A as time deciding agent 
  




%optimal compensation share 
gammaGL=(I*theta*(beta-1))/(I*theta+((I-GcL)*(beta-1))); 
gammaGLu=(I*theta*(beta-1))/(I*theta+((I-GcLu)*(beta-1))); 
%optimal investment threshold 
YgL=Yop*(theta/gammaGL); 
YgLu=Yop*(theta/gammaGLu); 
%Value of the option to invest for A 
VLaG=((1-gammaGL)*(YgL*Pie/(r-alpha))-(1-theta)*I+GcL)*((Y/YgL)^beta); 
VLaGu=((1-gammaGLu)*(YgLu*Pie/(r-alpha))-(1-theta)*I+GcLu)*((Y/YgLu)^beta); 
%The value of the option to invest for C 
VLcG=((gammaGL)*(YgL*Pie/(r-alpha))-(theta*I))*((Y/YgL)^beta); 
























xlabel('social benefits: Gb'); 




























xlabel('social benefits: Gb'); 
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